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Summary 
This thesis adapts the Generalized Division of Labor (GDL) human capital 
aggregator approach (Jones, 2014) of national context to cross-city analysis. By doing 
so, the thesis examines the determinants of urban productivity, then it accounts for 
skill concentration, nominal wage gap and welfare gap both across cities and over 
time (between 1980 and 2010)1.   
 The main body of the thesis presenting the works towards the main objectives is 
divided into two essays. In essay 1, I apply the GDL approach to an urban context and 
discuss properties of the production function. Those who get bachelors’ degrees and 
above are defined as high-skill workers, otherwise, they are low-skill workers. It is 
found from the discussion of the production function that more productive cities are 
higher educated as well as more frictional, although low-skill workers in these cities 
are more productive. Based on Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) data from 2005 to 
2012 in U.S, I calibrate the substitution elasticity at 1.6 with a standard deviation of 
0.23. This value is the substitution elasticity that fully accounts for the income 
variation across cities and the value that allows per capita human capital service of 
high-skill workers to fully capture the division of labor, i.e. urban productivity. I 
compare the GDL based urban productivity with mean wage rate and with Total 
Factor Productivity (TFP) in 2007, and find that urban productivity has larger 
variation across cities than either TFP or wage does.   
                                                             
1 Nominal wage gap is the ratio of high-skill earnings divided by low-skill earnings. The utility 
function quantifies welfare by indirect utility. Welfare gap is defined as the difference between 
welfare of high-skill workers and welfare of low-skill workers. 
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The division of labor is affected by coordination costs. Location fundamentals 
lowering coordination costs facilitate productivity. Market thickness in terms of large 
urban population and a large ratio of higher educated people lowers coordination costs. 
As referred to the equilibrium in essay 2, urban size and skill mix are determined by 
productivity, amenities and frictions orthogonally. Skill mix is represented by the skill 
ratio between high-skill population and low-skill population. In a reduced form, urban 
productivity is determined by all the three types of location fundamentals. Higher 
market potential, lower labor union coverage, more concentrated urban form (with 
city age as a proxy), clement climate, and larger housing supply elasticity (with the 
fraction of land area suitable for housing construction as a proxy), are all found to be 
significant. Subsequently, the effects of agglomeration economies are isolated from 
those of location fundamentals on urban productivity in structural form estimation. To 
isolate the agglomeration economies, amenity fundamentals and urban frictions are 
used to instrument urban size and skill ratio, capturing their cross-city variations that 
are independent of productive fundamentals. Urban studies such as Eeckhout et.al 
(2012) documents that middle-skill workers are squeezed out of large cities, so the 
structural determinants of middle-skill productivity are investigated. High-skill 
workers are those who have a college degree, middle-skill workers have 
post-high-school training without attaining a college degree, and low-skill workers 
receive no more than a high-school education. Structural estimates show that the 
sources of labor division benefits to heterogeneous skills are different. The productive 
location fundamentals are more important to middle-skill productivity. The 
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agglomeration economies by urban size and by skill mix are more important to 
high-skill workers. The elasticity of middle-skill productivity with respect to urban 
size is sizably negative. 
In essay 2, I apply the GDL approach in an urban accounting model of Desmet 
and Rossi-Hansberg (2013) to study the impacts of uneven location fundamentals, in 
terms of productivity, general amenities, high-skill preferred amenities and excess 
friction, on skill concentration (i.e. the standard deviation of the distribution of skill 
ratio), nominal wage gap and welfare gap between high-skill and low-skill workers. 
Given the aggregate population endowments of high-skill and low-skill workers, 
essay 2 calibrates model parameters and location fundamentals (to pin down the 
observations in reality) by 2010 U.S. MSA data and then perform counterfactual 
exercises by shutting down the dispersion in each location fundamental to assess their 
contributions. The general equilibrium fully captures the interdependence between 
skilled location choices and the dependences on local fundamentals.  
The equilibrium properties of the GDL urban accounting model are studied via the 
method of Taylor expansion in the absence of externalities. The low-skill utility is a 
function of skilled population endowments, second order derivations of the skilled 
population with respect to productivity, general amenity, high-skill preferred amenity 
and excess friction, the standard deviations of skilled population, and the correlations 
among these location attributes. So is the welfare gap. By giving the standard 
deviation of each location attribute a zero value, I find that dispersion in productivity 
reduces welfare inequality, although other three attributes respectively does the 
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contrary. Increasing high-skill population endowment 10 percent more than low-skill 
population causes larger low-skill utility and narrower welfare gap. Increasing total 
population by 10 percent reduces both low-skill utility and welfare inequality.  
 By equaling each location attribute to its population-weighted average, I perform 
several counterfactual exercises with and without externalities. In the absence of 
externalities, I find consistent results with those from the Taylor expansion. I find that 
dispersion in any of the other three location attributes enhances welfare gap and skill 
concentration except productivity. Dispersion in productivity predicts narrower 
welfare gap although it enhances skill concentration. This suggests that skill 
concentration may benefit low-skill utility in the GDL framework, due to the 
interdependence between high-skill and low-skill workers (i.e. imperfect substitution). 
Externalities also play important roles. With different externalities, location 
fundamentals contribute differently to skill concentration and welfare gap. In the 
presence of all externalities (productivity externalities and amenity externalities), 
shutting down dispersion in productivity fundamental increases welfare gap the least, 
and increases skill ratio dispersion the least, compared with other three counterfactual 
cases of location fundamentals. This may be largely due to imperfect substitution 
allowing the benefits of low-skill workers by working near high-skill ones to offset 
the welfare inequality caused by skill concentration. In addition, I also find that more 
high-skill supply facilitates intensive skill concentration (in all the counterfactual 
exercises); either with only productivity externalities or with all externalities, welfare 
gap is wider than that in reality.  
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Investigating the relationships among skill concentration, nominal wage gap and 
welfare gap in all the counterfactual exercises, I find that nominal wage gap and 
welfare gap has the correlation that becomes smaller and smaller and even negative as 
more externalities take effects. With all externalities, more skill concentration is 
concurrent with larger welfare gap, but skill concentration is negatively correlated 
with nominal wage gap. If skill concentration is due to that the supply force of 
desirable amenities outweighs the demand force of large productivity, the high living 
cost reflects amenity consumption. This may increase welfare inequality. I find that 
the role of amenities outperforms the role of productivity in the presence of amenity 
externalities since welfare gap is wider with amenity externalities either in 
counterfactual population case or in counterfactual skill ratio case. I also find that skill 
concentration does benefit low-skill workers with all externalities because the 
correlation between skill concentration and low-skill wage, the correlation between 
skill concentration and low-skill utility, both are positive.  
From 1980 to 2010, college graduates have increasingly concentrated into certain 
cities, nominal wage gap also has been wider. Essay 2 utilizes the same GDL urban 
accounting framework to evaluating changes in skill concentration, in nominal wage 
gap and in welfare gap of U.S. metro areas, by changes in location fundamentals, in 
externalities and in skilled population endowments. From the comparisons among 
counterfactual exercises, I find that either change in location fundamentals or change 
in skilled population endowments account for more skill concentration and wider 
welfare gap, while the change in externalities widens welfare gap but weakens skill 
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concentration. The counterfactual exercises also show changes in location 
fundamentals between 1980 and 2010 increase skill concentration, the nominal wage 
gap, welfare gap and low-skill utility. Change in nominal wage gap is not a reliable 
indicator of change in welfare gap since the correlation coefficient between 
counterfactual welfare gap and counterfactual means of the nominal wage gap is as 
low as 0.12. Change in welfare gap is highly correlated with change in skill 
concentration, suggesting that intensive skill concentration is concurrent with wider 
welfare gap. The analysis extends the work of Moretti (2013) and Diamond (2015). 
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Introduction to the Thesis 
The urban accounting for skill concentration and welfare gap 
According to the New York Times report (see Appendix Figure 1), on average, 
approximately 12% of adults in U.S. metro areas had college degrees in 1970, and this 
number raised up to 32% in 2010. Where did they locate? Higher educated people 
concentrate in certain cities. This is what we call skill concentration that generates a 
great dispersion of the skill ratio distribution. The upper two graphs show that, in the 
skill ratio distribution, nearly all cities were within 5 percentage points of the average 
in 1970, but in 2010 there were only half of metro areas within 5 percentage points of 
the average. The two ends of the skill ratio distribution became more extreme, that is 
to say, dispersion in the skill ratio distribution is enhanced. Top-ten smartest cities 
gauged by the percentage of college graduates in local labor force in United States are 
Seattle (53%), San Francisco (50%), Raleigh (50%), Washington, D.C. (45%), Austin 
(44%), Minneapolis (43%), Atlanta (43%), Boston (41%), San Diego (40%) and 
Lexington (40%) (Johnson, 2012). The lower two graphs show that the most educated 
cities include college towns such as Raleigh, Austin, and also include large 
metropolises such as San Francisco, Washington, and Boston.  
Since the 1980s, the nominal wage gap between college graduates and high school 
graduates has been expanded (Goldin & Katz, 2007a) (see Appendix Figure 2). The 
increasing nominal wage gap reflects lower human capital investment costs due to 
technology upgrading and policy orientation. Unlike human capital investment costs 
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variation across nations, in the urban context, skilled worker allocations are 
endogenous across cities. Given human capital investment costs, wage gap and skill 
concentration are respectively determined by both geography and agglomeration 
economies.  
The skill premium in wage rate is found to increase with city size (Baum-Snow, 
Freedman, & Pavan, 2014; Baum-Snow & Pavan, 2012), and is found to rise with 
skill concentration (Davis & Dingel, 2012, 2013). Two main hypotheses discuss the 
reasons behind. Under demand-driven hypothesis, skill-biased technical change 
(Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 2004), complementarity between skilled workers (Behrens, 
Duranton, & Robert-Nicoud, 2010; Giannetti, 2003; Venables, 2011), and 
complementarity between cities and skills (Berry & Glaeser, 2005; E. L. Glaeser & 
Mare, 2001; E. L. Glaeser & Resseger, 2010) widens nominal wage gap. Based upon 
supply-shift hypothesis, the young and educated are more likely to work in productive 
cities so as to gain learning-in-cities (Fu & Liao, 2012; E. L. Glaeser, 1999; E. L. 
Glaeser & Mare, 2001; Lucas, 2004). Other studies pointing out that industry-specific 
skill intensity as one demand force and breakdown of low-skill protective labor 
market institutions such as labor unions are arguments for the surging wage gap2.  
Amenities are becoming more and more important to location choices  
(Burchfield, Overman, Puga, & Turner, 2006; G. Duranton & Turner, 2011; 
Rappaport, 2007, 2008; Rappaport & Sachs, 2003). Recent studies document that 
cities better-off in amenity disproportionally attract more high-skill workers (Gyourko, 
                                                             
2 Katz and Autor (1999) and Goldin and Katz (2007b) offer comprehensive surveys of literature 
on nominal wage inequality. 
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Mayer, & Sinai, 2006; Lee, 2010), in addition to productivity shaping human capital 
concentration (Fu & Liao, 2012; Gennaioli, Porta, & Florencio, 2013; E.L. Glaeser & 
Gottlieb, 2009; E. L. Glaeser & Mare, 2001; E. L. Glaeser, Scheinkman, & Shleifer, 
1995). E. L. Glaeser, Kolko, and Saiz (2001) find that high amenity cities have grown 
faster than low amenity ones because the demand for living in cities has risen for 
reasons beyond rising wages. Handbury (2012) finds that higher income households 
pay more for higher quality groceries than lower income ones do. In the Places Rated 
Almanac where Quality of Living (QOL) rankings are listed, many large cities have 
quite better scores regardless of high costs of livings (Savageau & D'Agostino, 2000). 
Natural amenities are cooler summer, warmer winter, and social amenities include 
theaters, cafés, museums, and shopping centers etc. If high-skill workers are more 
tempted by desirable amenities, amenity becomes a driving force of uneven skill ratio 
distributions. When high-skill workers have a bigger willingness-to-pay (WTP) for 
urban amenities than their counterparts within the city, skill premiums in wage rate 
are decreasing in skill levels (Lee, 2010). In addition, higher income people may have 
specific preferences on amenities such as luxury stores, golfs, yachts, etc. A city offers 
such high-skill preferred amenities may facilitate skill concentration there.  
The uneven urban frictions across cities shape the endogenous distribution of skill 
ratio as well. As a city becomes more and more congested, bidding prices of housing 
services for each resident of the city are driven upward. Larger cities also have 
smaller housing supply elasticity. Saiz (2010) estimates the elasticity of housing 
supply in terms of both geographic housing supply constraints and land use 
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regulations (Wharton Residential Urban Land Regulation Index). In addition, as cities 
expand, the commuting distances between residences and workplaces are prolonged, 
and costs of commuting are raised. The kinds of cities which are more productive, 
more amenable but less affordable are called “Superstars” in Gyourko et al. (2006). A 
local government may be inefficient in providing public services and workers suffer 
more costs. These act as frictions which prohibit workers from being productive and 
consuming amenities in large cities.  
Location choices of high-skill and low-skill workers are interdependent. Winters 
(2012) shows that low-skill workers benefit from working near high-skill workers by 
enlarging low-skill labor force participation and their employment. Moretti (2004a, 
2004b) finds that college graduates supply raises wages of the less educated. 
Glaeser’s review of Moretti’s book illustrates that taco stand worker earns quite 
differently in Visalia (Visalia-Porterville, CA) and Menlo Park (San 
Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA) (E. L. Glaeser, 2013). One new high-tech job 
generates five more additional new local service jobs whether they are lawyers or 
hairdressers (Appendix Figure 3 abstracted from Moretti (2012)). Lindley and Machin 
(2014) document the labor market polarization which results in both faster 
employment growth in high skill occupations and a higher demand for low-wage 
workers in low-skill occupations. Middle-skill workers, however, are squeezed out of 
these kinds of cities since they neither are more demanded nor are able to acquire 
advanced knowledge to be more productive. Eeckhout et.al (2012) find that the skill 
distributions have “fat tails” ascribing to more presences of high-skill workers and of 
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low-skill workers but the fewer presence of middle-skill workers in large cities. 
Pereira-Lopez and Soloaga (2013) find consistent evidence of imperfect substitution 
between different skills in Mexico metropolitan areas. Indeed, New York City is 
home to investment bankers and busboys, San Francisco to Internet entrepreneurs 
and grocery clerks, Boston to BioMed engineers and the janitors who pick up their 
offices.  
Imperfect substitution between human capital service of the high-skill and of the 
low-skill captures the interdependence. Low-skill workers move to follow high-skill 
workers who create low-skill jobs such as hairdressers, janitors, and sanitation 
workers, etc. (Moretti, 2012). The imperfect substitution is of great importance 
because it captures the division of labor. Low-skill workers provide local services to 
high-skill ones, and this largely improves the efficiency of the higher income group 
by spending more time on what they are specialized. In Jones (2014) GDL framework, 
high-skill and low-skill workers are imperfect substitutes.  
To fully capture the interdependence between location choices, and the 
associations among uneven distributions of location attributes and location choices, a 
general equilibrium model accounting for skill concentration and wage gap are 
needed. In the homogenous skill urban accounting model of Desmet and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2013), urban size and utility are accounted for by geography and 
externalities. Extending the homogeneous urban accounting model to the two-skill 
case with the Application of the GDL approach, essay 2 is able to account for skill 
concentration, nominal wage gap and welfare inequality. 
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Studies on the change in welfare inequality over the past few decades are not 
conclusive. Moretti finds that welfare gap should be narrower than nominal wage gap 
because the concentration of college graduates is mainly due to the demand shift by 
large productivity, so the high frictions in these cities offset the benefits of high 
productivity. Diamond, however, finds that welfare gap is even wider than nominal 
wage gap since high-skill workers cluster in both productive and amenable cities. 
Welfare gap depends on the cost of living differential in relation to productivity 
differential and amenity differential across locations, besides the interdependent 
location choices. 
The skill supply change from 1980 to 2010 may enhance or reduce welfare 
inequality. On one hand, larger high-skill labor supply drives high-skill demand curve 
downward, thus narrows nominal wage gap; on the other hand, productivity 
externality by skill ratio and amenity externality by skill ratio both are stronger with 
more high-skill supply, thus widens nominal wage gap. So the change in welfare gap, 
the nominal wage gap, and skill concentration should be accounted for by the changes 
in skilled population endowments, in externalities, and in location fundamentals. The 
developed GDL urban accounting model in essay 2 characterizes the endogenous skill 
allocations due to imperfect substitution, geography, and externalities. This is the key 
difference from Jones (2014) in which costs of human capital investment determine 
wage gap. 
Urban productivity in the Generalized Division of Labor framework 
In Jones’ GDL framework, heterogeneous skill classes provide different services 
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which are imperfectly substituted. Inputs including physical capital and human capital 
in the neoclassical production function could fully account for the income variation 
across national economies with certain parameterization of the substitution elasticity 
(Jones, 2014), which means the need for Total Factor Productivity (TFP) residual 
difference is eliminated. Validated in U.S. urban context in the thesis, the mean value 
of the substitution elasticity is estimated at about 1.6. If also assuming identical 
per-capita low-skill human capital quality across cities, urban productivity is fully 
captured by per-capita service of high-skill workers (i.e. human capital quality of 
high-skill workers). Urban productivity is also the productivity of high-skill workers, 
and it embodies the collective acquisition of advanced knowledge. With lower 
coordination costs, the division of labor is more extensive, and urban productivity is 
higher. Low-skill productivity is represented by low-skill wage level and is improved 
by the scarcity of low-skill labor supply.  
As Jones (2014) points out, embodying the stock of productive knowledge (i.e. 
"ideas") into the workforce requires a division of labor. In the urban context, the 
division of labor is limited by the costs of coordination. Locations vary in productive 
fundamentals that affect coordination costs, such as access to markets (or market 
potential), an urban form that impedes or encourages social interactions, and political 
institutions like labor unions. Local market thickness (i.e. urban population and skill 
mix) reinforces agglomeration economies and reduces coordination costs. This 
provides channels for amenities and frictions to influence urban productivity. Based 
on the benchmark models of general equilibrium such as Rosen-Roback (1982) and 
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the equilibrium in essay 2, amenities and frictions shape urban population and local 
skill composition. This is a great divergence from Jones (2014) since spatial 
heterogeneities in amenity and friction influencing location choices are taken into 
account. That high-skill workers have larger willingness-to-pay (WTP) for urban 
amenities (Gyourko et.al, 2006; Lee, 2010) has an impact on local skill mix.  
The Superiority of urban productivity in the GDL framework 
Productivity variation across nations is largely reduced after accounting for human 
capital differentiation, as suggested by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). However 
according to national income accounting studies of Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare 
(1997), Hall and Jones (1999), and Bils and Klenow (2000), physical capital and 
human capital (in terms of schooling durations) by “unskilled equivalence” together 
can only predict 30 percent of income variation, and 70 percent of the credit goes to 
“Solow residual productivity” (i.e. Total Factor Productivity). In the urban context, 
Bacolod, Blum, and Strange (2009) claim that education duration or schooling years 
(i.e. human capital quantity) is not a good proxy for skill (i.e. human capital service). 
They find that the 4 cohorts have extremely similar education duration structure, 
although cities are classified into four cohorts by city size so that each cohort has 
different urban productivity. Due to the conflicted results and ignorance of the quality 
dimension of human capital, applying either of these two approaches to explain 
productivity variation across cities is unreliable.  
Ideas determine technology upgrading, so “idea gaps” reflects productivity 
disparities (Romer, 1990, 1993). Great ideas or advanced knowledge is carried by 
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workers in the form of human capital quality, so productivity variation should reflect 
the variation in the embodiment of advanced knowledge. Jones (2014) uses both 
quantity and quality of human capital to aggregate human capital stock (i.e. human 
capital quantity refers to schooling durations, and per capita quality indicates the flow 
of human capital service that a quantity can provide to production)3. What a skill mass 
offers to production is the human capital service measured by the multiplication of per 
capita human capital quality and quantity.  
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and wage are generally utilized as references of 
productivity. TFP captures what drives income variation but not explained by physical 
and human capital. The productivity disparity in 2007 between the 99th percentile city 
and the 1st percentile city is 27.9% versus 7.9% in terms of TFP (self-calculation)4. 
Wage represents the marginal product of efficient labor and the return to personal 
human capital investment, implying that more productive workers earn higher income 
(Abel, Dey, & Gabe, 2011; Acemoglu & Angrist, 2001; Berry & Glaeser, 2005; 
Caselli, 2005; E.L. Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2009; E. L. Glaeser & Resseger, 2010). 
High-skill workers holding college degrees and above earn an average wage that is 
about two times of the average wage earned by low-skill workers in 2007 (NBER 
MORG files). Although both the TFP variation and wage variation across cities are 
prominent, neither TFP nor wage is a good measurement of urban productivity. 
Urban productivity in the GDL framework is superior to TFP. In Solow’s 
                                                             
33 Manuelli and Seshadri (2014) also use both dimensions of human capital to account for income 
variation.  
4 The calculations of Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP), human capital and physical capital are 
described in Essay 1 Appendix. 
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production function, high-skill and low-skill workers perfectly substitute each other, 
while they are imperfect substitutes. Imperfect substitution brings about the division 
of labor. Therefore, heterogeneous skill levels become productive due to 
heterogeneous reasons instead of both skill types being productive due to the “Solow 
residual”. High-skill workers locate into where the division of labor is extensive so 
that they could collectively acquire advanced knowledge. By working near high-skill 
workers, low-skill ones become more productive due to scarce labor supply as more 
and more people receive higher educations. Secondly, TFP is a black-box fashion of 
accounting for productivity, how location fundamentals determine TFP is unclear. But 
through the GDL approach, location fundamentals explain urban efficiency since they 
affect the coordination costs which are lessened by exogenous location advantages 
and endogenous density in terms of urban population and skill mix5. Thirdly, the GDL 
approach does not require calculations of Gross Metropolitan Product (GMP) and 
physical capital to compute TFP, because it is not easy to retrieve high-quality data of 
them. Urban productivity in the GDL framework can easily be calculated from 
observed skilled supply, skilled wages and the calibrated substitution elasticity 
between heterogeneous skill types. 
                                                             
5 Other theories accounting for productivity variation include learning, matching and sharing by 
Marshall (1890), idea flows by Jacobs (1969), human capital externality (Lucas, 1988, 2004; 
Rauch, 1993; Roback, 1982), ex-ante self-selection (Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga, & Roux, 
2012; Eeckhout, Pinheiro, & Schmidheiny, 2010), ex-post sorting (Behrens et al., 2010; Venables, 
2011), the pecuniary externalities arising from job search and matching between productive firms 
and high skilled workers (Acemoglu, 1996), and aggregating firm level productivity into city level 
productivity (Haltiwanger, Lane, & Spletzer, 1999; Rigby & Essletzbichler, 2002). Ciccone and 
Hall (1996) demonstrates that many of these ideas lead to the same implication that productivity is 
rising in the density of economic activity. 
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   Wage is not productivity either. First, prices for differentiated labor services by 
different skill groups are distinct, so the marginal products by high-skill and by 
low-skill should be heterogeneously priced, then wages representing marginal 
products are not their productivity, and the wage gap between the two skill types does 
not measure productivity difference. Second, a basket of urban attributes including 
productivity, amenities and frictions together regulates wage. For example in Roback 
(1982) wage compensates for undesirable amenities since wage differential is largely 
reduced once amenity variation is taken into account. The spatial equilibrium model 
demonstrates that wage is also negatively explained by housing sector productivity 
and land supply (Glaeser and Goettlieb, 2009). Wage is not a one-to-one mapping to 
productivity across cities. Third, if the human capital stock is translated into 
“unskilled worker equivalents” (Heckman, Lochner, & Todd, 2003; Mincer, 1974), 
the human capital stock would be underestimated in a more amenable place where the 
nominal wage gap is narrower if the high-skill group have a larger WTP than the 
low-skill group.  
   The concepts of skill-biased technology change (SBTC) and urban productivity of 
GDL approach are not conflicts since high-skill quality embodies the advanced 
knowledge or higher technologies in the later concept. In the GDL framework, more 
skill types are allowed in the production function. Linkages between geographic 
attributes and urban productivity are created in the GDL framework via coordination 
costs, but SBTC does not have the explanation channels. SBTC is an exogenous force 
without knowing where the technology change comes from, instead, the GDL 
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framework emphasizes the greater collective acquisition of advanced knowledge by 
high-skill workers is what drives urban productivity. The imperfect substitution 
allows low-skill workers to be more productive by working near high-skill ones when 
low-skill workers are scarce.  
Factor-augmented productivity is less meaningful than productivity in the GDL 
framework, because in the later framework, both dimensions of human capital 
(quantity and quality) are taken into account, and income variation across cities is 
fully accounted for. 
   The thesis first adapts the GDL approach to an urban context and examines the 
determinants of urban productivity in essay 1. The adapted GDL approach 
characterizes imperfect substitution between skilled worker groups, and allows 
location fundamentals to directly determine urban productivity through agglomeration 
economies. This is what cannot be studied in the national context. In the general 
equilibrium of essay 2, endogenous human capital allocations determine nominal 
wage gap, and this is the key departure from cross-country analysis, where human 
capital investment costs determine the gap. The GDL urban accounting model 
reconciles the contrary conclusions of welfare gap change over the past few decades, 
by investigating the effects of changed location fundamentals, changed externalities 
and changed skilled population endowments. 
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Essay 1  Adapting the Generalized Division of Labor 
Approach to Urban Productivity  
 
1.1  Introduction 
This essay adapts the GDL human capital aggregating approach in Jones (2014) to 
the urban context, discusses production function properties, calibrates the elasticity of 
substitution, measures urban productivity using the GDL approach, and investigates 
spatial determinants of urban productivity. 
Figure 1.1 plots the relative skill mix against relative wage gap in 2007 for U.S. 
metro areas. Skill mix is the ratio of the high-skill population divided by low-skill 
population. The wage gap is the ratio of high-skill average income divided by 
low-skill average income. Each city is ranked respectively into percentile groups by 
TFP, and two cities in two groups are paired (i.e. 99th vs. 1th, 95th vs. 5th, 90th vs. 10th, 
75th vs. 25th percentile), for instance, city “A” with largest TFP in the 99th percentile 
group is paired with city “B” having the smallest TFP in the 1st percentile group. 
Relative skill mix equals the value of skill ratio of “A” divided by that of “B”. The 
vertical axis is the log of relative skill mix, and the horizontal axis is the log of the 
relative wage gap. Figure 1.1 displays that values of relative skill mix are within a 
fairly large range, while values of relative wage gap are within a small range around 
[-0.5, 0.5]. The fairly modest wage premium variation across cities suggests that 
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source of urban productivity variation is not the wage, but the skilled labor quantity. If 
high-skill labor is more abundant in a more productive city, the high-skill workers’ 
wage should be lower unless there is a skill quality advantage to keep high-skill 
earnings relatively high in these cities. This advantage in a more productive city is the 
collective acquisition of advanced knowledge by high-skill workers (Jones, 2014). As 
for low-skill workers, they must be scarce in a more productive city or else their wage 
is unable to keep the wage gap similar to that in a less productive city. 
 
Figure 1.1: Sources of human capital variation: labor supply vs. wage 
Source: 2007 Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups 
(CPS-MORG) Files and self-calculation. 
Acquisition of advanced knowledge is dependent on the division of labor, which is 
determined by the extent of the market and the coordination costs (Becker & Murphy, 
1992). The role of the market is to facilitate exchanges between buyers and sellers 
(Stigler, 1951), so the extent of this division must always be limited by the extent of 
that power, or in other words, by the extent of the market as it is the power of 
exchanging that gives occasion to the division of labor (Smith, 1776). As transaction 
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costs fall, the extent of the market is deepened to serve more consumers and expand 
labor division6. If transportation of goods within and across cities is costless, the 
extent of the market is dependent on the fixed labor quantity of the whole economy, 
i.e. each city has the equivalent extent of the market, and then advanced knowledge 
acquisition is dependent on the coordination costs. In a city where location quality is 
better (i.e. productivity fundamentals are abundant) and density is higher (i.e. market 
thickness is intensive), coordination costs are lowered.  
This essay first discusses the properties of the production function when the need 
of TFP is eliminated and urban productivity is fully embodied by the per capita 
quality of high-skill human capital, and when high-skill and low-skill workers are 
imperfectly substitutable. The elasticity of imperfect substitution could be estimated 
in the low-skill wage equation when assuming low-skill quality is invariant across 
cities, and it is calibrated using the 2005-2012 data for U.S. cities. To overcome the 
endogeneity issue, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation gives a 
mean of about 1.6 and a standard deviation of 0.23 for the parameter. Results from 
other estimation methods are also reported and are similar to that from the GMM. The 
parameterization of the substitution elasticity is the value for human capital and 
physical capital to fully account for the income variation across cities. Properties of 
the production function are in line with urban stylized facts, for instance, high-skill 
workers concentrate in the more productive cities, low-skill productivity is positively 
                                                             
6 Yang and Borland (1991) demonstrate that labor division raises the variety and consumption of 
various goods, but consuming variety occur transaction costs, hence expanding labor division or 
improving productivity or economic progress is limited by transaction costs such as heavily 
regulated institutions, doctrinaire norms, less open cultures. 
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dependent on high-skill productivity, and housing price is higher in more efficient 
cities.  
By the observed skill ratio and wage gap, urban productivity is measured. It is 
positively correlated with TFP and average wage rate, but it varies far more greatly 
across locations than either TFP or wage rate does. 
As referred to the equilibrium in essay 2, if agglomeration economies are present, 
a thicker market with larger urban size and bigger skill ratio has lower coordination 
costs, then amenities and frictions determine urban productivity through their effects 
on urban size and skill mix. Urban productivity is thus determined by all the location 
fundamentals in the reduced-form estimation of urban productivity. Results show that 
the urban productivity is higher in locations with better access to markets (higher 
market potential), lower labor union coverage, more clement climate, more compact 
urban form (city age as a proxy), and higher housing supply elasticity the fraction of 
land area suitable for housing construction as proxy). Market potential represents the 
external connectedness with other cities, and a larger market potential is a larger sum 
of demand of its neighbor cities. Less powerful unionism charges lower taxes on firm 
productivity and appeals to fewer low-skill workers, so more high-skill workers 
would collectively acquire advanced knowledge. An urban form with denser Central 
Business District (CBD) in earlier days due to transportation limits probably help 
people interact and help reduce coordination costs. Distance to water (coast or the 
Great Lakes) may matter because shorter proximity to docks, ports, or harbors, 
reduces transportation costs in the early days. However this productivity fundamental 
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is an insignificant factor in the modern times, e.g. 2005-2012 in this essay. Average 
high temperature in July and mean annual cooling degree days7 are undesirable 
amenities and larger value of either of the two discourages market thickness. Physical 
housing supply constraints are one type of frictions that also lower density.  
Robustness checks are conducted with the replacement of undevelopable area ratio by 
specific spatial housing supply constraints and with an alternative data sample. It is a 
sample calculated by average wages and average skills supply during 2005-2012. 
These robustness checks confirm the main results. 
The division of labor is only one possible mechanism among many to account for 
the greater efficiency of cities (G. Duranton & Puga, 2004; Smith, 1776), however, 
serious difficulties arise when attempting to measure the division of labor (Gilles 
Duranton & Jayet, 2011). Duranton and Jayet (2011) find that the division of labor 
strongly increases city population because the proportion of workers employed in the 
scarcest occupations is 69% larger in Paris than in the smallest French cities. The 
GDL approach builds connections between productivity and location fundamentals 
and provides more understandings on productivity than either TFP or wage rate does. 
All location fundamentals take effects on urban productivity through agglomeration 
economies.  
Essay 1 subsequently presents structural estimates of urban productivity, seeking 
to isolate the effects of agglomeration economies from those of productivity 
                                                             
7 Cooling degrees on a given day are one if the average temperature is below 65 °F (about 18 °C) 
and are zero if average temperature exceeds 65 °F (Burchfield et al., 2006). It is calculated from 
the climatic normals for individual weather stations from 1961 to 1990 contained in the Climate 
Atlas of the United States, 30 years are approximately10950 days. 
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fundamentals. Agglomeration economies are produced by market thickness in terms 
of both urban population size and skill mix. Agglomeration economies reduce the 
division-of-labor coordination costs. All location fundamentals including productivity, 
amenities and frictions determine urban size and skill mix, so as to influence urban 
productivity indirectly.  
   Davis and Weinstein (2002) measure factor productivity using the matrix of direct 
factor input requirements, and investigate the impacts of market size, cost linkages, 
and demand linkages for forty regions in Japan. It emphasizes the macroeconomic 
perspective of the determinants of urban productivity. Combes, Duranton, and 
Gobillon (2008) decompose individual wage disparities into variations from skill 
composition, local human capital interaction, and non-human endowments of cities. 
Their findings from a large French labor panel data suggest that individual skills 
contribute nearly fifty percent in accounting for productivity or wage inequality. Other 
classical papers decomposing urban productivity include Sveikauskas (1975), 
Henderson (1986), and E. L. Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman, and Shleifer (1992). Abel 
et al. (2011) explore productivity difference across U.S. Metropolitan statistical areas 
by estimating output per worker from a production function. These papers usually 
decompose wage rate or TFP by spatial factors; however, urban productivity using the 
GDL method is a full accounting, and can be investigated by location fundamentals 
and agglomeration economies through their impacts on coordination costs.  
It is of great importance to address agglomeration economies. Abel et al. (2011) 
document that doubling density in metropolitan areas with a human capital stock one 
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standard deviation above the mean yields productivity benefits that are about twice 
the average. E. L. Glaeser and Resseger (2010) illustrate that skill is complementary 
to large cities because agglomeration economies are particularly strong in cities with 
higher levels of skill and virtually nonexistent in less skilled metropolitan areas.  
Henceforth, quantifying the elasticity of urban productivity with respect to urban size 
and the elasticity to skill composition adds knowledge to the literature.  
The reverse causality issue exists in the structural estimation. Agglomeration 
economies explain higher efficiency, and efficiency also explains agglomeration in 
terms of urban size and skill composition. This essay adopts instrumental variable 
approach (IV) to deal with the endogeneity of agglomeration economies. Diamond 
(2015) uses the Bartik shocks as instruments for housing demand when identifying the 
elasticity of housing supply. Depending on the orthogonality among productivity 
fundamentals, amenity fundamentals and friction fundamentals in determining urban 
outcomes such as city size and skill composition (as referred to the equilibrium in 
essay 2), this essay uses amenity fundamentals and friction fundamentals to 
instrument urban size and skill ratio. Amenity fundamentals and friction fundamentals 
capture their cross-city variations that are independent of productivity fundamentals, 
so the reverse causality that productivity fundamentals explain agglomeration 
economies is eliminated. Instruments for urban size could be either fundamental 
amenities or geographic frictions or both. Instruments for skill composition can be 
amenities since high-skill workers have larger WTP for amenities than low-skill 
workers. If one assumes each worker consumes 1 unit of housing service, then 
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high-skill and low-skill workers face the same housing costs in a city, so one is not 
sure how frictions affect heterogeneously skilled workers’ supply in different ways, 
and frictions may be not good instruments intuitively. 
The other issue is simultaneity due to measurement error. Urban productivity is 
calculated by skill ratio, the wage gap, and the substitution elasticity. Skill ratio is one 
of the determinants of urban productivity. If the skill mix one observes from survey 
does not capture the equilibrium and even higher than in equilibrium, both skill ratio 
and urban productivity are upward biased, the estimated coefficient is thus upward 
biased. A two-stage method is utilized. In the first stage, I predict skill ratio by urban 
amenity fundamentals. In the second stage, impacts of the predicted skill ratio, 
productivity fundamentals and urban size on urban productivity are estimated using 
General Method of Moment (GMM). By doing so, instruments for urban size and 
those for skill ratio should not be highly correlated. 
One should note that the coefficients of productivity fundamentals in the second 
stage estimation capture only direct effects of them on urban productivity. These 
location advantages directly enhance productivity. Old cities with densely populated 
CBDs have been productive since in earlier days. Besides, an urban form with 
centralized CBD helps interactions and mingles with people. Market potential directly 
improves productivity ascribing to larger demands from neighboring cities. Shorter 
proximate to water may reduce transportation costs and increase productivity. 
Unionism discourages firm productivity by charging higher taxes, by reducing 
expenses on worker interaction equipment and by low attractiveness to high-skill 
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workers who are the engine of growth. In the second stage GMM estimation, urban 
size is instrumented by all location fundamentals. This is to say, indirect effects of 
productivity fundamentals are captured by the coefficient of urban size in the second 
stage.  
The estimations based on 2005-2012 MSA data show an elasticity of urban 
productivity with respect to population size ranging from 0.06 to 0.08, and an 
elasticity of urban productivity with respect to skill ratio ranging from 1.4 to 1.6. The 
contributions of productive fundamentals, including market potential, urban form, and 
labor union coverage remain significant as in the reduced form estimation.   
Essay 1 further examines productivity accounting in a three-skill group case in the 
GDL framework, to observe different location choices between high-skill and 
middle-skill workers and offer an explanation for the stylized fact of middle-skill 
workers. The stylized fact is that middle-skill workers are squeezed out of large cities 
(Eeckhout et.al, 2010). Skills are classified into high-skill, middle-skill and low-skill 
groups. High-skill workers have college degrees and above, middle-skill workers have 
post-high-school training without attaining a college degree, and low-skill workers 
receive no more than a high-school education. The share of high-skill workers rises 
with urban size but that of middle-skill workers declines with urban size. The share of 
low-skill workers is relatively constant across city-size groups except for the largest 
fifth percentile cities (i.e. 95 percentile) where low-skill worker shares are 
considerably high. It is found that college towns where there are more high-skill 
worker supplies are small but not necessarily unproductive. To fully capture the 
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phenomenon, instruments for skill mix in the three skill group incorporate both 
amenities and these high-skill supply factors such as land grant institutes and top 100 
world ranking universities. It is also found that high-skill worker productivity 
increases with city size but middle-skill worker productivity declines with city size. 
The productivity of low-skill workers appears to be U-shaped across city-size groups. 
Structural estimates show that middle-skill productivity benefits from the 
productivity fundamentals and the concentration of high-skill workers similarly as the 
high-skill workers but exhibits a sizable negative elasticity with respect to urban size. 
Significant location advantages for middle-skill productivity are concentrated CBD 
urban form, smaller union coverage, intensive market potential and distance to water 
(coast or the Great Lakes).  
1.2  Production function 
1.2.1 The setting 
In the urban economy, private capitals and skilled labor are perfectly mobile 
across cities. Homogenous final goods are costless traded across cities. The 
production inputs are human capital and physical capital, urban productivity is 
embodied in the human capital quality of high-skill workers because they collectively 
acquire advanced knowledge to be more productive. One skill group provides human 
capital service to production, and the human capital service is the multiplication of per 
capita human capital quality ih  and labor quantity iL , 1, 2i =  here represents 
low-skill and high-skill respectively. High-skill workers are those who achieve 
bachelors’ degrees and above, otherwise, they are low-skill workers. Suppose 
low-skill quality is location-free, i.e. 1h , since Jones (2014) has found that there is 
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modestly extra effect on productivity accounting when relaxing the identical unskilled 
assumption. The production technology of a representative firm in city j  is  
( ) 1,j j j j jY F K H K Hα α−= =                      (1.1) 
( )1 2,j j jH G H H=  
where jK  is physical capital stock and jH  is aggregate human capital stock. 
Human capital service of skill cohort i  in city j  is 
ij ij ijH h L=                                 (1.2) 
Human capital stock is 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 2 1 1 2 2,j j j j jG H H h L h L
ε
ε ε ε
ε ε
− − − 
= + 
 
             (1.3) 
where ε  is the elasticity of substitution between human capital services of the two 
skill masses; ε > 0  stands for imperfect substitution between the two skill levels. 
Assume city a  has a larger high-skill quality than city b  due to better location 
quality that stands for a composite of abundant productivity fundamentals, 
2 2a bh h>                          (1.4) 
   Both two types of skilled workers are paid by their marginal products, 
respectively 
1 1 1 /j j j jw Y G h Hα=                         (1.5) 
2 2 2 /j j j j jw Y G h Hα=                        (1.6) 
where /ij j ijG G H= ∂ ∂  which is the marginal increase in human capital stock with 
one unit of increase in human capital service of skill type j . The low-skill equivalent 
is 21 2
1
j
j j j
j
w
L L L
w
= +  for each city j . Equation (1.5) and (1.6) gives 
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1 1 2
j j j
j j
h w G
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=                           (1.7) 
1
1 1
2 2 2
1 1 1
j j j
j j
h w L
h w L
ε
ε ε− −   
=       
   
                      (1.8) 
2 2 2
1 1 1
j j j
j j
H w h
H w h
ε ε−   
=        
                          (1.9) 
1
2 2 2
1 1 1
j j j
j j j
H w L
H w L
ε
ε − 
=   
 
                          (1.10) 
Urban productivity variation and human capital service variation between the two 
skill types could both be computed by wage gap, skill composition, the elasticity of 
substitution, according to equation (1.8) and (1.10) respectively.  
Local human capital stock variation between type a  and type b  cities is a 
function of relative low-skill equivalent, relative low-skill labor supply if assuming 
identical low-skill quality. 
1
1 1
1
1
a a b
b b a
H L L
H L L
ε
ε ε− −   
=    
   
                       (1.11) 
1.2.2 The properties of the production function 
 Assume the two types of cities have the same discount rate of the economy, i.e. 
the wage gap 2 1j jw wφ =  is constant across different locations
8.  
Lemma 1.1  Either more productive or more educated cities have larger high-skill 
human capital service. 
2 2
1 1
j j
j
H h
H h
ε
εφ −
 
=  
    
and  
( )2 1
2
/
0j j
j
H H
h
∂
>
∂
               (1.12) 
                                                             
8 If wage gap is determined by amenity that is assumed invariant across cities here, wage gap 
should be a constant. 
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Lemma 1.2  In cities with larger high-skill human capital service, a marginal increase 
in human capital stock with one unit of increasing in low-skill human capital service 
is higher. Low-skill productivity then is higher in more productive cities. 
1
1
1
1
j
j
j
L
G
L
ε − 
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∂
                       (1.15)
 
Low-skill wage is equivalent to low-skill productivity because the low-skill 
quality is assumed a constant. In a more productive place (i.e. 2 jh  bigger), low-skill 
workers are more likely to be close to high-skill ones, whom strengthen the scarcity of 
low-skill workers and make low-skill workers get higher payments. These are in line 
with studies such as Eeckhout et al. (2010), Winters (2012) and Moretti (2004a). 
Lemma 1.3  If the elasticity of substitution 1ε > , high-skill workers are more 
concentrated in the productive city, city a . 
1 1
1 1
2 2 1
2 2 1
a a b
b b a
h L L
h L L
ε ε− −   
=    
   
                    (1.16) 
Recall that city 1 is more productive with 2 2 1a bh h > , then when 1ε > , 
2 1
2 1
1a b
b a
L L
L L
> , i.e. 2 1
2 1
a a
b b
L L
L L
>                      (1.17) 
Inequality (1.17) implies that high-skill workers are distributed more dispersedly 
between the two cities than low-skill workers, so the concentration of high-skill 
workers is produced in the more productive city a .   
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In addition, suppose the cost of living in the city a  relative to that of the city b  
is p , in equilibrium the cost of living is higher in the more productive city a . 
Lemma 1.4  Workers face unequal housing prices in the two cities. The cost of living 
in the more productive city a  is higher. 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1 ( 1)
1 2
1 1
1 2
a
b
h h
p
h h
ε ε ε
ε ε
φ
φ
− − −
− −
 +
=  
+  
                     (1.18) 
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0
a
p
h
∂
>
∂                               
(1.19)
 
where p  is relative housing price, and 1
1
a a
b b
P wp
P w
= = . Proofs of the four lemmas are 
found in Essay 1 Appendix I. 
1.2.3 The calibration of the substitution elasticity 
This subsection calibrates the elasticity of substitution by estimating equation 
(1.21). It is obtained by taking log of equation (1.15), 
1
1
1log log
1
j
j j
j
L
w e
Lε
 
= +  −  
                     (1.21) 
where ( )1log j jL L  is low-skill equivalent per low-skill labor in the city j .  
Low-skill wage rate is productivity of low-skill workers. The independent variable 
1j jL L  represents the division of labor since ( )( )1 2 1 2 11j j j j j jL L w w L L= + . 
Because low-skill productivity affects the low-skill population, it influences skill mix 
in the independent variable. The instrumental variables of 1j jL L  could be 
productivity fundamentals and friction fundamentals. Amenity fundamentals are not 
adopted, because low-skill wage compensates for undesirable amenities while 
low-skill productivity is not influenced by productivity fundamentals and frictions but 
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by skill composition. Productivity fundamentals such as urban form and distance to 
water (either to the coastal areas or to the Great Lakes) are utilized. Friction 
fundamentals such as physical housing supply constraints used to calculate the 
housing supply elasticity in Saiz (2010) are adopted: share of land that is not ocean 
within 50 km Radius, undevelopable area ratio, share of land with slope < 15% within 
50 km Radius, and share of open water, woody lands. According to American history 
of economy, city age is grouped into six groups as below9, 
 Post-American Civil War: year_d = 1 if cities are born within 1790-1860 
 Gilded age: year_d = 2 if within 1870-1890 
 Progressive era: year_d = 3 if within 1900-1920 
 Great depression: year_d = 4 if within 1930-1940 
 Post-World War II: year_d = 5 if within 1950-1970 
 Post-inflation woes：year_d = 6 if within 1980-2000. 
The geographic units are metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) based on the year 
2003 definition by Office of Management and Budget (OMB). An MSA is A Core 
Based Statistical Area (CBSA) associated with at least one urbanized area with a 
population of at least 50,000, based on the 2000 Census. A metropolitan area requires, 
at least, a core urbanized area of at least 50,000 people, and a metropolitan area is a 
collection of one such core area and more inhabitants. Wage data and skill data from 
Current Population Survey (CPS-MORG files) between 2005 and 2012 are pooled. I 
make use of Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORG) dataset at NBER. It is an 
                                                             
9 Roaring twenties is between 1920 and 1929, which is not included, because the data sample has 
no city that is founded within that period. Information is collected from Wikipedia.com. 
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extract of the basic monthly survey data of Current Population Survey (CPS). CPS is 
a joint work of U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor Statistics. It offers 
high-quality profiles of demographics for the overall nation and is a primary source to 
count on for policy makers. MORG files identify geographic units rested on OMB 
definitions, which keeps the data from measurement error caused by transformation 
from other geographic codes to MSA. These files extract high-quality weekly 
earnings during the household’s fourth and eighth month in the CPS interview. In a 
rotating monthly panel survey like CPS, new entries cause the sample to change each 
month. Fifty percent is common from year to year for the same month. MORG files 
only excerpt a household’s fourth and eighth monthly interviews, the probability of 
common observations from year to year is less than twenty-five percent. To obtain a 
representative sample and more precise estimates from a large sample, and to avoid 
unnecessary definition confusions because CBSA definitions changed in the year 
2003 and year 2013, I select MORG files from the year 2005 to the year 2012 to 
constitute the pooled cross-sectional data sample. Wages and population of the two 
skills could be retrieved from MORG files. From CPS documentation, the high-skill is 
defined with the highest level of school > 40, which incorporates workers gaining 
associate degrees and above; the low-skill is defined as the highest level of school <= 
40, which is made up of workers obtaining some college but no degree, high school 
graduates and below. To control for year heterogeneity from 2005-2012, the 
estimations include seven year dummies (except the benchmark year dummy variable). 
Essay 1 Appendix II describes more details about data sources and variable 
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constructions. 
Table 1.1: The elasticity of substitution, 2005-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES logw1 logw1 logw1 
Panel A: IV-2SLS   
logLL1 1.425*** 1.401*** 1.375*** 
 (0.33) (0.32) (0.31) 
Constant 9.388*** 9.411*** 9.433*** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
    
Weak-identification statistic 10.131 11.015 11.246 
Over-identification P-value 0.58 0.56 0.55 
Estimated ε  1.702 1.714 1.727 
    
Panel B: IV-Two-step GMM    
logLL1 1.591*** 1.574*** 1.547*** 
 (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) 
Constant 9.247*** 9.251*** 9.274*** 
 (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
    
Weak-identification statistic 10.131 11.015 11.246 
Over-identification P-value 0.58 0.56 0.55 
Estimated ε  1.629 1.635 1.646 
    
Panel C: IV-LIML  
logLL1 1.514*** 1.515*** 1.597*** 
 (0.63) (0.62) (0.36) 
Constant 9.317*** 9.314*** 9.249*** 
 (0.50) (0.52) (0.28) 
    
Weak-identification statistic 12.895 13.325 17.732 
Over-identification P-value 0.39 0.39 0.30 
Estimated ε  1.661 1.660 1.626 
    
Panel D: IV-Iterative GMM   
logLL1 1.969*** 1.949*** 1.794*** 
 (0.34) (0.33) (0.31) 
Constant 8.866*** 8.836*** 8.992*** 
 (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) 
    
Weak-identification statistic 6.58 7.31 7.50 
Over-identification P-value 0.41 0.40 0.41 
Estimated ε  1.507 1.513 1.557 
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Observations 1,360 1,360 1,360 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Notes: Instruments are city age dummy, distance to water, the share of land that is not ocean 
within 50 km Radius, undevelopable area ratio, the share of land with slope < 15% within 50 km 
Radius, and share of open water, woody lands. All regression errors are corrected by clusters of a 
share of land that is not ocean within 50 km Radius. Column (2) controls for year fixed effect; 
Column (3) controls for year fixed effect and replace one of the instruments, distance to water, by 
a water dummy. The city has a coastal area or the Great Lakes area if the coastal dummy equals 1 
and 0 otherwise. See Essay 1 Appendix II for data sources. 
In MORG Extracts of CPS, some workers will reappear in adjacent years while 
some will be new entries, therefore, errors are inevitably heteroskedastic. As 
suggested in the Documentary files of CPS, standard errors should be corrected by 
“_robust” within Stata, known as the Huber-White-sandwich estimate of variance 
(Huber, 1967; White, 1980). Furthermore, it is highly possible that productivity of 
workers within a region or district are not independent (eg. cities located around the 
Great Lakes or near coastal areas show similar patterns of productivity), so residuals 
of productivity estimation equations are dependent, disobeying the independent and 
identical distributed (i.i.d) assumption of error terms. To allow for the errors of the 
within-cluster cities to be correlated while assuming independence of the between-city 
errors, all equations are estimated using the modified sandwich robust estimator, by 
“_cluster” in Stata (Froot, 1989; Williams, 2000; Wooldridge, 2002). 
Table 1.1 reports the estimated elasticity of substitution by four different 
estimation methods: two-stage least square (2SLS), two-step generalized method of 
moments (two-step GMM), limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML), 
iterative GMM. 
As can be seen, all examinations pass the Hansen’s J over-identification tests. In 
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Column (1)-(3), similar estimation values of the substitution elasticity are found. The 
estimated values of the elasticity locate within the narrow range [1.507, 1.727]. The 
calibration is analogous to what Jones (2014) finds, which is about 1.6. Diamond 
(2015) also obtains an estimation of the elasticity of substitution at 1.6. Besides, 
GMM estimates are more efficient in the case of heteroscedasticity. The following 
discussions in the thesis take 1.6 as the value of the elasticity of substitution. This 
value is the one under which income variation across cities is fully accounted for, and 
urban productivity is fully embodied in high-skill quality (with the assumption of 
identical low-skill quality).  
1.2.4 The comparisons among urban productivity, TFP and wage 
1.2.4.1 Ranking lists of urban productivity and human capital stock 
In terms of urban productivity, Table 1.2 ranks the 20 most productive MSAs and 
the 10 least productive U.S. MSAs in 2007, with the elasticity of substitution valued 
at 1.6. From equation (1.8), 2 jh  represents urban productivity when 1 1h = . As can 
be seen, the top 3 productive MSAs are Tallahassee (Florida), Holland-Grand Haven 
(Michigan), and Santa Fe (New Mexico). Tallahassee is desirable in amenities, 
tempted for people, especially for high-skill. This motivates the deterministic roles of 
amenities enhancing productivity. Santa Fe is a booming city with advanced science 
and technology. Grand Haven also has been one of many technology leaders in West 
Michigan. Holland has very nice coastal weather with many public beach accesses. 
Alternative values of elasticity of substitution at 1.5 and 1.7 produce substantially the 
same outcomes. 
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Based on equation (1.11), relative human capital stock a bH H  to the benchmark 
city is ranked, and the benchmark city b  refers to Prescott (AZ) (the least productive 
one in Table 1.2). The value of the log of relative human capital in Prescott (AZ) is 2. 
Table 1.2: The most 20 and the least 10 productive cities in U.S. in 2007 ( ε =1.6) 
Rank     MSA                             Log of Urban productivity 
 
1.     Tallahassee, FL                                    
2.     Holland-Grand Haven, MI                           
3.     Santa Fe, NM                                     
4.     Bloomington-Normal, IL                            
5.     Ann Arbor, MI                                    
6.     Duluth, MN-WI                                   
7.     Gainesville, FL                                    
8.     Iowa City, IA                                      
9.     Johnstown, PA                                     
10.     Columbia, MO                                     
11.     San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA                    
12.     Binghamton, NY                                    
13.     Durham, NC                                       
14.     San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA                    
15.     Raleigh-Cary, NC                                   
16.     Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY                         
17.     La Crosse, WI-MN                                  
18.     Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV       
19.     Fayetteville, NC    
20.     Niles-Benton Harbor, MI    
 
239.  Corpus Christi, TX 
240.  El Centro, CA 
241.  Altoona, PA 
242.  Michigan city-La Porte, IN 
243.  Modesto, CA 
244.  Macon-Warner Robins, GA 
245.  Madera, CA 
246.  Longview, TX 
247.  Florence-Muscle Shoals, AL 
248.  Prescott, AZ 
Source: Self-calculation. 
Table 1.3 lists the most 20 metro areas with the largest log of relative human 
3.61 
3.22 
3.19 
3.10 
2.99 
2.80 
2.77 
2.76 
2.74 
2.62 
2.54 
2.20 
2.35 
2.31 
2.31 
2.26 
2.21 
2.20 
2.03 
2.02 
 
 -.58 
-.60 
-.75 
-.80 
-.85 
-1.10 
-1.25 
-1.56 
-1.96 
-2.01 
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capital stock and the least 10 ones with the smallest log of relative human capital 
stock. Cities with massive human capital stock are in general large cities. 
Table 1.3: The most 20 and the least 10 cities in U.S. in 2007 with largest human 
capital stock ( ε =1.6) 
Rank     MSA                              Log of human capital stock 
 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
 
239.  
240.  
241.  
242.  
243.  
244.  
245.  
246.  
247.  
248.  
 
Notes: Self-calculation. The benchmark city is Prescott, AZ.  
1.2.4.2 Comparisons of urban productivity, TFP and wage 
23.28 
16.22 
13.72 
13.08 
11.97 
11.34 
10.41 
9.50 
9.49 
9.31 
9.30 
9.21 
8.41 
8.18 
7.48 
7.25 
7.19 
7.04 
6.19 
6.08 
 
 
New York-Newark-Edison, NY-NY-PA 
Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana, CA 
Santa Fe, NM 
Chicago-Naperville-Joliet, IL-IN-WI 
Ocean City, NJ 
Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 
Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Miami Beach, FL 
Bowling Green, KY 
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 
Iowa City, IA 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale, AZ 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA 
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 
 
1.97 
1.96 
1.94 
1.94 
1.93 
1.92 
1.91 
1.90 
1.89 
1.87 
 
 
Modesto, CA 
Canton-Massillon, OH 
Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 
Lancaster, PA 
York-Hanover, PA 
Ocala, FL  
Flint, MI 
Vallejo-Fairfield, CA 
Santa Barbara-Santa Maria-Goleta, CA 
Corpus Christi, TX 
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Association between urban productivity and TFP is 45.92% while the correlation 
between urban productivity and local average wage is 71.69%. Although the three 
measurements are highly correlated, the variation across cities that they capture is 
different. Urban productivity, TFP, and mean local wage are respectively partitioned 
by percentiles: 99th, 95th, 90th, 75th, 25th, 10th, 5th and 1th. These percentiles are paired 
into comparison groups (higher percentile vs. lower percentile): 99th vs. 1th, 95th vs. 5th, 
90th vs. 10th, and 75th vs. 25th. Urban productivity is measured using the same 
methodology as in Table 1.2. TFP is the “Solow residual” that is Gross Metropolitan 
Product (GMP) divided by human capital share and physical capital share, with 
human capital computed by aggregate full-time working hours (Desmet and 
Rossi-Hansberg, 2013). Mean wage is annually average earnings transformed by 
weekly earnings of those full-time employed workers. Essay 1 Appendix II offers 
details of the data sources and calculations. 
Table 1.4: Comparisons of the three measurements, 2007 
          Times 
Percentiles TFP Urban productivity Wage 
99th vs. 1th 3.63 115.71 25.30 
95th vs. 5th 2.29 15.20 6.90 
90th vs. 10th 1.91 7.06 2.74 
75th vs. 25th 1.48 2.90 1.50 
Source: self-calculation, e.g. values of the times are calculated by dividing 99th percentile 
productivity by 1th percentile productivity. 
As can be seen from Table 1.4, comparison of each pair in terms of urban 
productivity is larger than those of TFP and wage, implying that it would be too 
modest to represent urban productivity by either TFP or wage because neither wage 
nor TFP is able to document the full variation of productivity across locations. TFP, 
mean wage, and urban productivity all follow normal distributions but mean wage 
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distribution has peak kurtosis with a thinner shape. 
1.3  Reduced form determinants of urban productivity 
As referred to the equilibrium in essay 2, urban size and skill structure are 
respectively function of the three urban attributes, such as 
( ), ,jj j jproductivity amenities frictN f ions=  
( ), ,jj j jproductivity amenities frictS f ions=  
If coordination costs are diminished in thicker market, urban productivity is a function 
of both location advantage and market thickness, ( )2 , ,j j j jh f A N S= , where location 
advantage 
( ), , ,jj j j jUrban form Institutions Market potential Distanceto waA f ter=   (1.22) 
Then urban productivity could be estimated by location fundamentals in a reduced 
form 
( )2 , ,j j j jamenities frictih f A ons=                   (1.23) 
1.3.1 The data and variables 
Urban form matters for productivity. Cities with high-density CBD(s) are more 
likely to be productive due to better coordination. City age is an appropriate proxy for 
urban form. Kim (2002) examines the long-run adjustment of urban spatial structure 
(i.e. urban form) by one of its representation, i.e. density that is represented by 
persons per square mile. He finds that density decline for those urban areas born in 
later times, especially in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Moreover, 
with the lowered transportation costs due to the growing usage of automobiles, higher 
income people have contributed to the decline in population density of CBD(s) 
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because these households increased their demands for larger spaces from housing. 
Besides, an older city with longer urban history might facilitate better ideas flows and 
mingles with people. Data of city age is obtained from Wikipedia.com, more details 
are found in the Essay 1 Appendix II.  
City age dummies (e.g. grouped by city age, and the younger cities are in the 
larger dummy groups) then could be used as a proxy for the decentralized urban 
form10. Besides grouping city ages according to American history of economy, I also 
classify born years of cities into groups conforming to the evolution of transportation 
modes, from walking era to private automobile days 11 . In older cities, it is 
time-consuming to travel ascribing to old day’s urban planning. It will take nearly 45 
minutes for people to walk 2 miles while automobile car is able to travel 40 miles on 
highways within the same minutes. Therefore, older cities are easier for concentration 
but costly for decentralization. I classify six groups according to the invention time of 
transportation vehicles and give each city age dummy variable (“d_trans”) a value, 
 Walking era: d_trans = 1 if born year < 1835 
 Horse wagon ear: d_trans = 2 if born year>=1835 & born year < 1875 
 Cable car era: d_trans = 3 if born year >= 1875 & born year < 1890 
 Electric tramway era: replace d_trans=4 if born year>=1890 & born 
                                                             
10 As Kim (2002) stated, the potential reasons to use city age as IV of population density are two: 
one is pattern dependence (Krugman, 1991) that initial advantage are locked into those cities that 
achieve density at an earlier time period; the other one is durable housing (E. L. Glaeser & 
Gyourko, 2005) that older cities are more dense because they are more likely to have a larger 
housing stock composed of very durable apartments rather than single detached house. 
11  E. L. Glaeser, Kahn, and Chu (2001) do not find significant evidence of employment 
centralization in large metropolitan areas, neither do they find that urban sprawl is a function of 
city age. Unfortunately I have no access to the data, i.e. employment within three miles of CBD. 
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year<1910 
 Subway and bus and small number of private auto: d_trans = 5 if born 
year >= 1910 & born year < 1945 
 After World War II, widespread private automobile: d_trans = 6 if born 
year >= 1945. 
A powerful unionism may cut down social networkings among workers. Lindley 
and Machin (2014) find that faster union decline predicts the bigger relative demand 
for college graduates. Unions at whatever cost protect their members from being 
discriminated and unfairly treated. However, the union could be hazardous for 
productivity growth. On one hand, it appeals to low-skill workers since they are the 
relatively vulnerable group with lower salaries. There is no stable engine for 
productivity growth with a low share of high-skill workers. One the other hand, a 
powerful unionism charges higher taxes on firm productivity. To a large extent, the 
equipment for workers to social and interact might be lessened since fewer retained 
earnings are left after union charges. Current Population Survey (CPS) asks 
interviewees the question whether they are covered by a union contract, allowing 
investigating impacts of union memberships on urban productivity. Union coverage is 
the percentage of union membership in the whole labor force. In order to avoid 
endogeneity between unionism and productivity, I use manufacturing industry 
employment share in 2003 to instrument the union coverage percentage before 
estimations of urban productivity. 
This paper also examines the impacts of external connectedness on urban 
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productivity. Closer connections with other cities bring about more accesses to outside 
markets. “Market potential” says goods demand of a location is a sum of demand of 
its own and of its neighbors’12, weighted by the bilateral distance between the city and 
each of its neighbor (Hanson, 2004; Harris, 1954). Moretti (2012) I adjust “market 
potential” in Harris (1954) by excluding one city’s own demand because the sum of 
all cities’ demand is a fixed amount in the urban system. Besides, the adjusted market 
potential avoids the endogeneity between the income of the city itself and its 
productivity, where the city j  is the destination and city 'j  is the origination city. 
Lower weights are given to those cities which are further distant from the originations. 
Through the product-market linkage, a city with a larger market potential is near a 
concentration of consumer and industrial demand and has higher productivity. 
Bilateral distances are retrieved from Fu and Liao (2012). GMP is the summation of 
high-skill earnings and low-skill earnings obtained from CPS-MORG files.  
( )
2
'
' , '
j
j
j j
GMP
Market Potential
d j j≠
= ∑  
Shorter distance to water (coast or the Great Lakes) should matter on account of 
decreased transportation costs and is conducive to productivity. I define MSAs located 
along the Great Lakes and those which have at least one coast area as the coastal cities. 
Their distance to water is recorded as 0.1. I also calculate the minimum distance of a 
city to its nearest coastal city (or the Great Lakes city) from the distance matrix of Fu 
and Liao (2012), as the city’s distance to water. Moreover, due to the fact that 
                                                             
12 Market potential here refers to the demand sum of one city’s all neighbors excluding its own 
demand. The reason is that the sum of all cities is a fixed amount in the urban system. 
39 
 
transportation costs are lower in cities closer to a coast, it might be easier for them to 
have access to potential markets.  
Table 1.5 is the summary statistics, in which definition, mean and standard 
deviation of both dependent and independent variables are reported. The sample is a 
pool of cross-sectional data from the year 2005 to 2012 of U.S. MSAs. Reasons for 
pooling data in the calibration of substitution elasticity apply here. 
Table 1.5: Descriptive statistics: U.S. MSAs 
Variable Definition Mean Std.dev 
logh2 Log of urban productivity 11.21 0.79 
logMP Log of “market potential” 58.01 1.20 
unionhat Predicted union coverage percentage 0.07 0.01 
d_trans City age dummies: 1-6, 6 is the youngest 4.19 1.52 
logDistw Log of distance to water (coast ; Great Lakes) 3.02 2.53 
july_h Average high temperature in July (℃) 30.92 3.81 
lcooling_dd Log of mean annual cooling degree days 6.99 0.72 
coastal_cbsa Coastal area binary dummy: 1= yes 0.41 0.49 
unaval Undevelopable area ratio 0.24 0.21 
FLAT_SHARE_50_15 Share of land with slope < 15%; 50 km radius 89.09 17.09 
lu11 Share of open water in land areas; 50 km radius 0.02 0.03 
lu91 
Share of woody wetlands in land areas; 50 km 
radius 
0.04 0.06 
lu92 
Share of  emergent/herbaceous wetlands in land 
area; 50 km radius 
0.02 0.05 
Note: 2005-2012. 
1.3.2 The estimations 
Utilizing Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression method, Table 1.6 examines the 
impacts on the log of urban productivity by geographic features: location advantages, 
amenities, and frictions. As can be seen, Column (1) reports the impacts from only 
productivity fundamentals, Column (2) demonstrates the impacts from both location 
advantages and amenities, and Column (3) includes effects from physical housing 
supply friction synthesized by undevelopable area ratio for housing (Saiz, 2010).  
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Throughout the three columns, market potential has significantly positive impacts 
on urban productivity, and 1% increase of “market potential” leads to about 0.047%  
Table 1.6: Geographic determinants and productivity, 2005-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES logh2 logh2 logh2 
    
logMP 0.044** 0.047*** 0.047*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
unionhat -31.166*** -35.910*** -37.658*** 
 (3.33) (3.68) (3.90) 
d_trans -0.108*** -0.079*** -0.072*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
logDistw -0.003 0.057 0.050 
 (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) 
july_h  -0.020*** -0.022*** 
  (0.01) (0.01) 
lcooling_dd  -0.134*** -0.143*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) 
coastal_cbsa  0.273 0.273 
  (0.19) (0.18) 
unaval   -0.250** 
   (0.12) 
Constant 11.325*** 12.621*** 12.957*** 
 (1.05) (1.13) (1.14) 
    
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,200 
R-squared 0.113 0.145 0.148 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
the increase in productivity. Union coverage percentage also is significant, and 1 more 
percent rise in union membership predicts 37.658 percent fall in productivity. As a 
proxy for urban form (with concentrated CBD), the coefficients of city age dummies 
classified by the transportation mode are also significant. This is to say, younger cities 
are less likely to have concentrated CBDs, so their productivity is lower. However, 
impacts of distance to water (coast or the Great Lakes) are insignificant in all the three 
columns. The reason might be that transportation costs in modern economy have lost 
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its credit to other location advantages in terms of facilitating coordination. Glaser and 
Goettlieb (2009) reviews that costs of moving a ton by rail has declined in real terms 
by more than 90 percent since the late nineteenth century and the rise in trucking has 
been even more dramatic (E. L. Glaeser & Kohlhase, 2004). As a consequence, access 
to the Great Lakes or other major waterways has become less valuable over the 
twentieth century.  
Hostile climate conditions such as cold winter and hot summer would be 
dis-amenities, fewer workers, and even fewer high-skill workers would locate in cities 
with these kinds of climate conditions, resulting in lower coordination. Non-coastal 
cities offer no beach which is also counted as one sort of amenities. One Celsius 
degree (℃) higher in average high temperature in July results in about 2.2% decline in 
urban productivity. Meanwhile, 1% increase in the log of mean annual cooling degree 
days leads to 0.143% fall in productivity. But beaches do not significantly matter for 
productivity in the reduced form examinations. Note that this does not mean that 
coastal areas are not nice urban amenities.  
Undevelopable area ratio for housing supply is an overall indicator that captures 
one aspect of urban frictions, deterring workers from locating to the city. As can be 
seen, 1% increase in undevelopable area ratio brings about 0.25% decrease in urban 
productivity. 
1.3.3 Two robustness checks 
Column (1) in Table 1.7 decomposes the undevelopable area ratio into specific 
geographic housing supply constraints, such as flat landscape, the share of open water, 
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and share of woody wetlands, etc. As can be seen, the share of land area with slope 
lower than 15% within 50 kilometers radius is positively significant, implying that flat 
geographic condition is conducive for supplying houses with lower frictions. 
Column (2) displays the reduced form results when year fixed effect is controlled 
(2005-2012). All the significant determinants in Table 1.6 are still significant in 
Column (2) of Table 1.7 except market potential.  
Table 1.7: Two robustness checks 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES logh2 logh2 
   
logMP 0.045*** 0.037 
 (0.02) (0.03) 
unionhat -38.754*** -37.417*** 
 (3.93) (3.85) 
d_trans -0.062*** -0.081*** 
 (0.02) (0.01) 
logDistw 0.038 0.048 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
july_h -0.021*** -0.022*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
lcooling_dd -0.193*** -0.138*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) 
coastal_cbsa 0.158 0.260 
 (0.19) (0.19) 
unaval  -0.235** 
  (0.12) 
FLAT_SHARE_50_15 0.006***  
 (0.00)  
lu11 0.531  
 (0.78)  
lu91 -0.452  
 (0.47)  
lu92 0.094  
 (0.44)  
Constant 4.657*** 5.093** 
 (1.12) (2.04) 
   
Year dummy N Y 
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Observations 1,200 1,200 
R-squared 0.160 0.183 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
1.4  Identification strategies for structural estimation 
To structurally determine their impacts, I specify urban productivity as 
2
N sA
j j j jh A N s
η ηη=                          (1.24) 
where jN  is city size and Nη  is the productivity elasticity of urban size, sη  is the 
productivity elasticity of skill mix, i.e. 2 1j j jN L L= +  and 2 1j j js L L= . Location 
advantage jA  is defined as in equation (1.22). Take log of equation (1.24), 
2log log log logj A j N j s j jh A N sη η η υ= + + +                 (1.25) 
1.4.1 Estimation issues and identification methods 
The greatest concern is reverse causality. The two-way explanation between 
productivity and urban size, and the two-way explanation between it and skill mix 
create endogeneity problems. Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimates for the 
agglomeration economies would be upward biased. The three determinants of city 
size (or skill mix) are orthogonal to each other: productivity fundamentals, amenity 
fundamentals, and friction fundamentals. Amenities and frictions must be 
uncorrelated with omitted productivity fundamentals in the error term, jυ , so they 
could be instruments of urban size and skill mix. However, it is not obvious that 
frictions would affect heterogeneous skilled workers in different ways. Since 
high-skill workers have larger WTP for urban amenities, amenity instruments should 
be suitable for skill composition. 
   Another issue is the simultaneity caused by measurement error. One component to 
calculate urban productivity is the skill ratio. If one observes a higher skill ratio than 
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in equilibrium, the computed productivity is higher than in equilibrium as well, and 
the estimated effect of skill mix should be upward biased. To deal with it, I utilize a 
two-stage method. Predicted skill ratio by amenity fundamentals is calculated in the 
first stage as in equation (1.26). The predicted skill ratio would not simultaneously 
raise its effect on urban productivity through measurement.  
log j j js jρ s= +                         (1.26) 
where jρ  is captured by fundamental amenities such as local weather conditions. In 
the second stage, predicted skill ratio log js , instrumented log jN (by amenities, 
frictions, and productivity fundamentals) and location advantages determine urban 
productivity using the GMM estimation method. 
1.4.2 Data and variable construction 
Wage data and skill labor data are the same as in essay 1. Reasons for utilizing the 
pooling sample apply here. Constructions of productivity fundamentals are the same 
as in the first essay. Amenity instrument variables are a log of climate score, the 
average low temperature in January, the average high temperature in July, heating 
degree days and cooling degree days. Friction instrument variables are mainly 
geographic housing supply constraints such as the percentage of MSA overlaying 
aquifers, the ratio of 50 km Radius that is not in the ocean, the ratio of a land area 
with slope < 15% within 50 km Radius, terrain ruggedness index for the entire MSA, 
elevation range for the entire MSA. Their sources are G. Duranton and Turner (2011), 
Sperling and Sander (2007), Saiz (2010). More details could be found in Essay 1 
Appendix Table 1 with variable definitions and sources. Essay 1 Appendix Table 2 
provides descriptive statistics of dependent and main independent variables. 
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Three robustness checks are performed. Alternative proxies of urban form 
(concentrated CBD) such as different classifications of city age groups are used. Eight 
years pooled sample is reduced to one year sample by averaging the eight years’ 
observations. Alternative amenity variables in Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013) 
replace the original amenity instruments in the third robustness check. 
1.5  Empirical results: two-skill case 
1.5.1 Structural determinants of urban productivity 
Two-step GMM estimation method is adopted since the number of instrumental 
variables is larger than the number of endogenous variables, a log of urban size; 
moreover, in the Two-step GMM, a second weighting matrix based on the results of 
initial weighting matrix is calculated and used to obtain more consistent parameter 
estimates. Estimations in the two columns in Table 1.8 all pass over-identification 
tests based on the P-values of Hansen’ J test. Instrumental variables for urban size in 
Column (1) and (2) are amenities and frictions. Column (2) also controls for year 
fixed effect (2006-2012). The dependent variable is a log of urban productivity with 
low-skill human capital quality 1 10h = .  
As can be seen, agglomeration economies by population and by skill mix are 
respectively quantified. One percent rise in the log of the population results in 6.7 
percent increase in urban productivity. As summarized by Rosenthal and Strange 
(2004), “doubling city size seems to increase productivity by an amount that ranges 
from 3-8 percent.” Ahlfeldt, Redding, Sturm, and Wolf (2014) estimate the elasticity 
of productivity with respect to urban size to be 0.07. Behrens et al. (2010) report a 
calibration of urban size elasticity at 0.05. Agglomeration economy by skill mix is 
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about 1.501, meaning that one percent rise in high-skill ratio leads to 1.501 percent 
increase in productivity. 
Table 1.8: Productivity and structural determinants 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES logh2 logh2 
   
logN 0.067*** 0.067*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) 
logshat 1.502*** 1.501*** 
 (0.12) (0.12) 
logMP 0.047*** 0.043*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
logDistw 0.005 0.005 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
unionhat -33.204*** -33.146*** 
 (2.53) (2.50) 
2.d_trans -0.216** -0.216** 
 (0.09) (0.09) 
3.d_trans -0.351*** -0.351*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
4.d_trans -0.391*** -0.391*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
5.d_trans -0.416*** -0.416*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
6.d_trans -0.494*** -0.494*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) 
Constant 2.492*** 2.527*** 
 (0.53) (0.90) 
   
Year dummy N Y 
Hansen’s J P-value 0.5907 0.5925 
Observations 1,200 1,200 
R-squared 0.174 0.202 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Two-step GMM. “logshat” is the log of skill ratio instrumented by amenities. “unionhat” is 
the union membership share instrumented by manufacturing share in 2003. Instruments for a log 
of urban size are both amenity instruments and friction instruments. Regression errors are 
corrected by clusters of the ratio of land that is not ocean within 50 km Radius. 
Note that the coefficients of productivity fundamentals here represent their direct 
effects on productivity. The urban form of concentrated CBD is one important 
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location advantage. Compared with the walking era when the main transportation 
method is on foot (before 1835), cities born later (younger cities) are apparently less 
productive. For instance relative to the walking era, cities born during the horse 
wagon age (“d_trans”=2) are 21.6 percent less productive. Old cities are previously 
densely populated and productive. Due to restrictions on fast commuting, urban 
planning of older cities tend to confine economic activities within a smaller scope, so 
they are more likely to have the urban form of concentrate CBD, where intensive 
coordination especially face-to-face interaction happens and urban productivity is 
facilitated. 
Influences coming from external connectedness are testified by their market 
potential. Larger market potential means more access to markets and aggregate 
demand of neighbors which drive productivity. With 1 percent increase in “Market 
potential”, productivity is strengthened by 0.043 percent.  
Impacts of institutional elements such as union coverage on urban productivity are 
also examined. Labor unions generally speak for the low-skill workers and protect 
their lawful rights, therefore during the decline of manufacturing and rise of the 
knowledge economy, labor unions as the strong backup for low-skill workers are 
disadvantages for productivity. Urban productivity is lowered with a larger coverage 
of union members, with 1 percent higher union coverage reducing productivity by 
about 33.15 percent. 
Proximity to water (coast or the Great Lakes) however is not a significant location 
advantage in the structural estimation, conforming to the result of reduced form 
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estimation.  
1.5.2 Robustness checks 
Three sensitivity tests are performed. The first one in Table 1.9 alters the proxies 
for urban form. Column (1) reports the results when city age is grouped into six 
clusters according to American history of the economy as discussed in the reduced 
form. It is found that younger cities are less productive. 
Table 1.9: Productivity and determinants: alternative proxies for urban form 
Year dummy Y Y Y 
Hansen’s J P-value 0.5858 0.3798 0.4659 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Column (2) directly uses city age as the proxy and also finds that older cities tend 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES logh2 logh2 logh2 
    
logN 0.082** 0.065*** 0.079** 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
logshat 1.499*** 1.456*** 1.470*** 
 (0.16) (0.14) (0.12) 
logMP 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
logDistc -0.002 -0.009 -0.002 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
unionhat -34.698*** -33.446*** -34.202*** 
 (3.95) (2.85) (2.94) 
year_d -0.080***   
 (0.02)   
logAge  0.085***  
  (0.02)  
2.d   -0.112*** 
   (0.04) 
3.d   -0.199*** 
   (0.04) 
Constant 2.863*** 1.813*** 2.173*** 
 (0.98) (0.66) (0.72) 
    
Observations 1,200 1,200 1,200 
R-squared 0.202 0.194 0.199 
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to be more productive. Column (3) is the case when grouping city age into three 
cohorts. Utilizing this proxy for urban form still shows a consistent result that younger 
cities are fairly unproductive. 
 Before World War I: d = 1 
 During WWI and WWII: d = 2 
 After WWII: d = 3. 
Table 1.10: Productivity and determinants: alternative amenities 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES logh2 logh2 logh2 
    
logN 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.081** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
logshat 1.594*** 1.579*** 1.618*** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.09) 
logMP 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.032* 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
logDistw 0.002 -0.001 -0.004 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
unionhat -23.297*** -21.952*** -23.581*** 
 (2.70) (3.02) (6.46) 
year_d -0.011** -0.004 -0.009 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Constant 1.615*** 1.505*** 2.106 
 (0.54) (0.45) (1.32) 
    
Year dummy N N Y 
Hansen’s J P-value 0.1493 0.3185 0.7692 
Observations 864 864 864 
R-squared 0.413 0.413 0.437 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The second robustness check is executed when previous amenity instruments are 
replaced by a new set of amenity variables utilized by Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2013). They are annual days in excess of 90 degree in Fahrenheit (℉), annual days 
below 32 degree (℉), relative humidity in July, average low temperature in January 
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(℉), July heat index (average of relative humidity and average high in ℉), and other 
indexes (education, health, crime, transportation, art and culture, recreation)13. Table 
1.10 reports the results. In Column (1), both urban size and skill ratio are 
instrumented by the new set of amenities, and frictions remain in the instrument set 
for urban size. In Column (2) and (3), skill ratio is instrumented by the new set of 
amenities, but the original set of amenities instrument urban size besides frictions. 
Column (3) controls for year fixed effect. Results show that productivity elasticity 
with respect to urban size and that with respect to skill mix respectively are significant. 
Market potential and declining labor union still are significant productivity 
advantages.  
Table 1.11: The elasticity of substitution: averaged one-year sample 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 2SLS Two-step GMM LIML 
VARIABLES logw1 logw1 logw1 
    
logLL1 1.328*** 1.514*** 1.405** 
 (0.32) (0.23) (0.59) 
Constant 9.482*** 9.327*** 9.421*** 
 (0.26) (0.17) (0.46) 
    
Weak-identification statistic 15.935 15.935 9.235 
Over-identification P-value 0.5051 0.5051 0.3231 
Estimated ε  1.753 1.661 1.712 
    
Observations 170 170 170 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note: Column (1) uses 2SLS estimation method; Column (2) uses Two-step GMM method; 
Column (3) uses LIML estimation method. Instruments are city age dummy, distance to coast, a 
number of coastal areas, the ratio of land that is not ocean within 50 km Radius, undevelopable 
area ratio, the ratio of land with slope < 15% within 50 km Radius, and ratio of open water, woody 
lands. Regression errors are corrected by clusters of the ratio of land that is not ocean within 50 
                                                             
13 Places Rated Almanac by Savageau (2000) and the Cities Ranked & Rated by Sperling and 
Sander (2004).  
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km Radius. 
The repetitive inclusion of observations over years (2005-2012) might be 
mechanic to cause overestimation of these effects. In Table 1.11 and 1.12, I reduce 
sample size from the eight years pooled cross-sectional sample to an averaged 
one-year sample. Each element in the averaged one-year sample is an average of its 
eight-year observations. For instance, to calculate the mean skilled wages (high-skill 
wage and low-skill wage), I give the same weight for each of the eight years’ mean 
wages and calculate arithmetic means for each city. Similarly, observations of urban 
productivity,  
Table 1.12: Productivity and Determinants: averaged one-year sample 
 (1) 
VARIABLES logh2 
  
logN 0.072** 
 (0.03) 
logShat 1.445*** 
 (0.18) 
logMP 0.114** 
 (0.05) 
logDistw 0.001 
 (0.00) 
Unionhat -35.426*** 
 (2.77) 
2.d_trans -0.178* 
 (0.09) 
3.d_trans -0.386*** 
 (0.08) 
4.d_trans -0.342*** 
 (0.08) 
5.d_trans -0.415*** 
 (0.08) 
6.d_trans -0.476*** 
 (0.08) 
Constant -1.376 
 (3.63) 
  
52 
 
Hansen’s J P-value 0.4484 
Observations 151 
R-squared 0.278 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
city size, skill ratio, location advantages such as concentrated CBD urban form, 
“market potential” and union membership coverage are compressed to the averaged 
one-year sample with 246 observations.  
Table 1.11 examines the calibration of elasticity of substitution using the averaged 
one-year sample. Estimations are consistent with those using pooled data. 
Robustness checks of urban productivity using the averaged one-year sample are 
conducted in Table 1.12. Conforming to estimations in Table 1.8, location advantages 
and agglomeration economies are all significant determinants of productivity14. 
1.6  Empirical results: three-skill case 
This section further explores the determinants of productivity for the case of three 
skill groups: high-skill, middle-skill, and low-skill, and accordingly investigates 
different location choices between high-skill and middle-skill workers.  
Recent attention has been extensively paid to the skill composition disparity 
across locations. Eeckhout et. al (2010) eloquently demonstrate that skill distributions 
in larger cities have fatter tails, i.e. there are bigger ratios of high-skill and of low-skill 
workers in larger cities while middle-skill workers are squeezed out into smaller cities. 
I present ratios of the three skilled groups over city size by box plots15. City size is 
classified into six groups: bottom 5th percentile; the first quartile excluding bottom 5th 
                                                             
14 There is no substantial change occurred when the assumption of invariant low-skill quality is 
relaxed, i.e. urban productivity is 2 1i ih h . 
15 One advantage of box plot is that there is no need to assume a particular form of distribution. 
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percentile; the second quartile excluding the first quartile; the third quartile excluding 
the second quartile; 95th percentile excluding the third quartile; top 5th percentile. 
Figure 1.2 shows that proportions of high-skill workers are increasing with city size. 
Middle-skill proportion is smaller in larger cities in Figure 1.3. From Figure 1.4, 
low-skill ratios in megacities (i.e. the largest fifth percentile cities) are much higher 
than in other cities, suggesting that low-skill workers are more demanded there. 
Moreover, high-skill workers are concentrating in larger cities, for the fact that the 
distance between the 3rd quartile and the 1st quartile (i.e. the height of box) is 
shrinking in city size while middle-skill workers are largely evacuating from larger 
cities.  
Another significant finding from the box plots is there are many outliers in Figure 
1.2-1.4 16 . In smaller cities, college towns such as Lawrence (Kansas), 
Bloomington-Normal (IL), Iowa city (IA), Ann Arbor (MI), Tallahassee (FL), Duluth 
(MN-WI), Boulder (CO), etc., gain extremely big high-skill ratio. Large cities in 
which famous universities located such as Madison (WI), San Jose (CA), Minneapolis 
(MN-WI), and Durham (NC), are also powerfully magnetic to high-skill workers.  
                                                             
16 Mild outliers refer to those observations with values out of the range: [Q1-1.5IQR, Q3+3IQR]; 
extreme outliers are those with values out of the range: [F-3IQR, F+3IQR]. 
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Figure 1.2: High-skill population ratio over city size 
Source: The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau (population division) 
More presences of high-skill and low-skill workers in large cities could be partly 
due to higher productivity. As can be seen from Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.7, both  
productivity of high-skill and of low-skill workers are relatively high in large cities, 
while middle-skill productivity declines with urban size in Figure 1.6. High-skill 
worker productivity increases with city size. The productivity of low-skill workers 
appears to be U-shaped across city-size groups. 
In line with Figure 1.2, outliers appear again in Figure 1.5, implying that some 
college towns are more educated as well as highly productive. As Moretti (2012) 
asserts, innovative high-tech hubs (including college towns) are the generators of 
sustainable growth. Figure 1.7 demonstrates that low-skill workers are more 
productive in large cities due to imperfect substitution. 
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Figure 1.3: Middle-skill population ratio over city size 
Source: The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau (population division) 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Low-skill population ratio over city size 
Source: The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau (population division) 
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Figure 1.5: High-skill productivity over city size 
Source: The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau (population division) 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Middle-skill productivity over city size 
Source: The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau (population division) 
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Figure 1.7: Low-skill productivity over city size 
Source: The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau (population division) 
This section of three-skill case contributes to the literature by understanding 
heterogeneous location behaviors of high-skill and middle-skill workers. Middle-skill 
workers may rely heavily on productivity fundamentals while high-skill productivity 
depends extensively on agglomeration economies. It offers an explanation for the 
stylized fact about middle-skill workers. In a denser market where coordination costs 
are lower, high-skill workers acquire a load of advanced knowledge and become more 
productive; meanwhile, middle-skill workers also are able to gain knowledge to be 
more productive. The knowledge acquired by middle-skill workers is either less than 
that by high-skill workers or insufficiently advanced to boost productivity. Low-skill 
workers receive the benefits due to imperfect substitution; specifically, they are scarce 
in large cities. As a consequence, middle-skill workers evacuate from large cities.  
1.6.1 Identification 
Human capital stock now is 
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where subscript 1 represents low-skill, 2 represents middle-skill, and 3 represents 
high-skill 17. Low-skill quality is assumed to be identical across locations. The 
productivity of middle-skill workers 2 jh  is calculated by equation (1.28), and that of 
high-skill workers 3 jh  is computed by equation (1.29). 
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Structural decompositions of middle-skill productivity and high-skill productivity are 
respectively 
2 2 2 2 2log log log logj A j N j S j jh A N Sη η β υ= + + +              (1.30) 
3 3 3 3 3log log log logj A j N j S j jh A N Sη η β υ= + + +              (1.31) 
where location advantage jA  consists of an urban form, market potential, and local 
labor unionism, city size is jN , and skill mix is the share of high-skill workers 
3j j jS L N= . The reasons to define the skill mix in this way are: (1) 3 1j jL L  could 
be incorrect in large cities where both high-skill and low-skill workers are more 
present; (2) this could partially avoid the simultaneity due to measurement error. 
Beyond the estimation issues stated in the two-skill case, Figure 1.2 and 1.4 depict 
a bigger picture of college towns. They are utterly small but remarkably highly 
                                                             
17 In the three-skill case, finer classification of skills does not imply a finer division of labor. It is 
a more reliable representation of skills. 
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educated, yet extreme outliers. To cover the information from the outstanding 
phenomenon of college towns, I further instrument the skill share jS  by high-skill 
supply factors such as land grant institutes and top 100 universities listed in the World 
Reputation Rankings in 2012 by the effort of Times Higher Education, besides urban 
amenities. These two factors are supposed to be uncorrelated with omitted 
productivity fundamentals in the error terms 2 jυ  and 3 jυ . World Reputation 
Rankings are calculated based on their annual Academic Reputation Survey that 
reflects evaluations of scholars and academics. There are 43 out of the top 100 
universities in the United States, and some cities even have three such universities, 
such as Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana (CA), New York-Newark-Edison 
(NY-NJ-PA), and Boston-Cambridge-Quincy (MA-NH).  
The two-stage estimation applies. I first predict skill ratio log jS  by its 
instruments: land grant institutes, top 100 universities, and amenity fundamentals, 
then perform structural estimation of middle-skill productivity and high-skill 
productivity using GMM method. The averaged one-year sample constructed in above 
robustness check (Table 1.12) is used for subsequent empirical exercises.  
1.6.2 Empirical results 
In Table 1.13, middle-skill productivity in column (1)-column (4) is respectively 
negatively explained by agglomeration economies by population, when different city 
age cohorts are utilized to proxy for urban form. These suggest that middle-skill 
workers are worse off with higher productivity elasticity with respect to urban size, 
which is consistent with the stylized facts that middle-skill ratios are smaller in large 
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cities. However, effects of location advantages such as concentrated CBD urban form, 
market potential, union member percentage and the distance to water (coast or the 
Great Lakes) are significant. The further a city is from water (either coast area or the 
Great Lakes), the less productive middle-skill workers within the city are.  
From Table 1.14, both agglomeration economies by urban size and by skill mix 
enhance high-skill productivity. The coefficient magnitude of the log of skill mix for 
high-skill productivity is larger than that for middle-skill productivity, i.e. 2.693 > 
2.641. This suggests that high-skill workers benefit more from agglomeration 
economies by skill structure than middle-skill workers do. Intensive concentration of 
high-skill workers better facilitate interactions and lower coordination costs, so 
high-skill workers could collectively acquire more advanced knowledge. The mean of 
high-skill productivity is 3.02 in the two-skill case while the mean of high-skill 
productivity is 7.26 in the three-skill case. That is why the coefficients of both urban  
Table 1.13: Middle-skill productivity and structural determinants 
 (1) 
VARIABLES logh2 
  
logN -0.618*** 
 (0.04) 
logShat 2.641*** 
 (0.41) 
logMP 0.337*** 
 (0.06) 
logDistw -0.014* 
 (0.01) 
unionhat -26.924*** 
 (4.27) 
2.year_d -0.409*** 
 (0.09) 
3.year_d -0.673*** 
 (0.08) 
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4.year_d -0.794*** 
 (0.17) 
5.year_d -0.874*** 
 (0.11) 
6.year_d -1.422*** 
 (0.21) 
Constant -0.247 
 (3.32) 
  
Hansen’s J P-value 0.4460 
Observations 151 
R-squared 0.219 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
size and of skill mix are much higher in Table 1.13 and Table 1.14 than those in 
Tables of the two-skill case. 
Comparing the effects of determinants on productivity, I find that all productivity 
fundamentals are significant for middle-skill productivity, including market potential, 
labor union coverage, distance to water and urban form with concentrated CBD. 
However, some productivity fundamentals do not show significant impacts on 
high-skill productivity. This result implies that moving highly productive industries 
Table 1.14: High-skill productivity and structural determinants 
 (1) 
VARIABLES logh3 
  
logN 0.194** 
 (0.08) 
logShat 2.693** 
 (1.32) 
logMP 0.604*** 
 (0.06) 
logDistw 0.004 
 (0.01) 
unionhat -28.281*** 
 (5.26) 
2.year_d -0.030 
 (0.11) 
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3.year_d -0.143 
 (0.19) 
4.year_d -0.257* 
 (0.16) 
5.year_d 0.008 
 (0.17) 
6.year_d -0.614* 
 (0.33) 
Constant -26.255*** 
 (4.34) 
  
Hansen’s J P-value 0.8838 
Observations 151 
R-squared 0.304 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(e.g. financial industry in New York) into other cities with abundant productivity 
fundamentals (e.g. Philadelphia) may be unable to boost productivity of the cities with 
location advantages, since agglomeration economies are of great significance to 
improve urban productivity. Analogously, moving the labor force of San Francisco to 
a desert would create another productive city. This signifies the growing importance 
of knowledge economy in driving economic development. 
1.7  Conclusions 
Productivity is dramatically unequal across spaces. By adapting Jones’ (2014) 
Generalized Division of Labor aggregator of human capital to the urban context, this 
essay measures urban productivity, when the elasticity of substitution is calibrated at 
about 1.6 using U.S. metro area data. The calculated urban productivity is highly 
correlated with TFP and wage rate; however, it shows stronger variation across 
locations than either TFP or wage rate does. This essay also discusses properties of 
the production function. With constant nominal wage gap assumption, the production 
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function has the properties that in more productive cities, low-skill workers are more 
productive, high-skill workers are more concentrated there, and housing costs also are 
higher.  
Coordination costs are lower with certain productivity fundamentals in a thicker 
market. As referred to the equilibrium in essay 2, urban productivity could be 
accounted for by all location fundamentals in a reduced form, because market 
thickness in terms of urban size and skill mix are determined respectively by 
geographic determinants. The reduced form estimation demonstrates that market 
potential, urban form with centralized CBD(s), and union coverage have significant 
impacts on productivity, the average high temperature in July and annual mean 
cooling degree days impair productivity, and housing supply constraints as one form 
of urban frictions also have negative impacts. 
Subsequently, essay 1 isolates the effects of productivity fundamentals from those 
of market thickness in structural form estimation. The reverse causality issue and 
simultaneity issue caused by measurement error are coped with by a two-stage IV 
approach. According to essay 2, the orthogonality among the three location 
fundamentals’ effects on urban size and skill mix allows amenities and frictions to be 
good instruments for urban size and skill mix, in the estimation of urban productivity. 
The productivity elasticity of urban size is in line with what have been documented in 
previous urban studies, ranging from 0.06 to 0.08, and that of skill ratio ranges from 
1.4 to 1.6. Productivity is higher in larger and more educated cities, as well as in cities 
with urban form of concentrated CBD, intensive market potential, and declining labor 
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unionism. 
This essay further examines location choices of high-skill workers and of 
middle-skill workers. Due to agglomeration economies by population do harm to 
middle-skill productivity and that agglomeration economies by skill mix are less 
important, middle-skill workers are squeezed out of large and educated cities where 
agglomeration economies are strong. The productivity of middle-skill workers, 
however, relies heavily on exogenous location advantages such as concentrated CBD 
urban form, market potential, distance to water, and labor union coverage. High-skill 
workers choose to locate in large and productive cities ascribing to their extensive 
dependence on agglomeration economies.  
With the adaption of the GDL approach in the urban context, essay 1 delineates a 
picture on which urban productivity is determined by geographic fundamentals and 
agglomeration economies. Endogenous human capital allocations across cities affect 
agglomeration economies, thus determine urban productivity. This is a deviation from 
the national context where human capital investment costs influence the decision of 
receiving higher education. This essay also quantifies agglomeration economies by 
both population and by skill composition in the framework of the GDL approach. This 
essay offers a more profound picture of urban productivity when skills are 
heterogeneous, than either wage rate or TFP does.  
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Essay 2  Urban Accounting for Geographic Concentration 
of Skill and Welfare Inequality 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Two important developments of the U.S. labor market over the past few decades 
are the nominal wage gap between college graduates and high-school graduates, and 
the education level across cities (see e.g. Katz and Autor, 1999; Autor, Katz and 
Kearney, 2004; Moretti, 2012, 2013; Lindley and Machin, 2014; Diamond, 2015). 
The mean of nominal wage gap rose from about 1.5 in 1980 to about 1.9 in 2010 
(Census 1980 and Census 2010). The gap in the share of adults with college degrees 
between the most educated metro area and the least educated one, among the 100 
largest U.S. metro areas, increased from 13.2 percentages points in 1970 to 31.8 
percentage points in 201018. That large quantity of college graduates clustering in 
more productive, more amenable and more expensive cities generates enormous 
demand for low-skill workers, is summarized by “the Great Divergence” (Moretti, 
2012): there are more skilled workers in high-tech and innovation industries or sectors, 
and more demand for low-skill workers in low-tech and service industries or sectors. 
The facts including skill concentration and increasing nominal wage gap raise the 
question whether welfare gap between the college graduates and high-school 
                                                             
18 The New York Times, May 31, 2012: Cities with the Most College-Educated Residents, 
available at http://www.nytimes./com/interactive/2012/05/31/us/eucation-in-metro-areas.html. 
Source: Brookings Metropolitan Policy Program. 
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graduates has widened, as highlighted by Moretti (2013) and Diamond (2015).  
The answer to the welfare inequality question depends on whether the high cost of 
living in the more educated metro areas is a result of better amenities (labor supply 
factors) or a result of higher productivity (labor demand factors). Attempts have been 
made to account for the influence of location fundamentals, with respect to both 
productivity and amenities, on the respective location choices of college graduates 
and less-educated workers; however the findings are not conclusive (see Moretti, 
2013; Diamond, 2015)19. Moretti (2013) shows that real wage gap should expand 
more than nominal wage gap during 1980 and 2000 if high-skill workers locate into 
congested cities due to larger high-skill demand relative to abundant amenities. 
Diamond (2015), in particular, employs a conditional logit model to account for the 
location choices of the workers. The model is capable of predicting the labor mobility 
due to changes in exogenous location fundamentals but does not fully account for the 
endogenous effects of labor mobility on urban productivity and amenities20. Absent in 
the literature is a general equilibrium analysis, where the allocation of high-skill and 
low-skill workers across metro areas is constrained by their respective population in 
the whole economy and can be jointly determined with its effects on endogenous local 
productivity and amenities. Such analysis is the objective of the present paper, and it 
is carried out in the GDL urban accounting model: an urban accounting framework 
                                                             
19 Moretti (2013) suggests that the increase in welfare gap is much smaller than the nominal wage 
gap; Diamond (2015), on the other hand, suggests that the former is much bigger. 
20 Diamond (2015) decompose change in welfare gap into changed wage (including exogenous 
Bartik productivity and agglomeration economies), changed rents (exogenous housing supply 
elasticity and endogenous urban size), and changed endogenous amenities since fundamental 
amenities changes are unobserved. Her doing so has the shortage that impacts from agglomeration 
economies are unable to be delivered to endogenous productivity and endogenous amenities. 
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(Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2013) that incorporates a generalized-division-of-labor 
accounting of local productivity in the presence of heterogeneous human capital 
among workers (Jones, 2014), given skill-specific preferences to amenities and the 
aggregate endowment of high-skill and low-skill workers.  
From 1980 to 2010, U.S. has been witnessed an expansion in higher education, 
more and more people receive college degrees and even above. In 1980, the mean 
percentage of college graduates and above in labor force across cities is 22 percent 
while the number surges to 40 percent in 2010 (Census 1980 and Census 2010). The 
larger aggregate endowment of high-skill workers on one hand drives high-skill 
demand curve down and may reduce wage gap. On the other hand, it enhances the 
agglomeration economies by skill composition because essay 1 finds that larger 
high-skill ratio facilitates market thickness that lowers coordination costs but 
improves urban productivity, so it may raise wage gap. 
 
Figure 2.1: Urban productivity and size, education: 1980 vs. 2010 
Source: 1980 census 5% sample and 2010 census. 1980: 225 cities; 2010: 255 cities. 
Note: Coefficients are significant at 1% level. 
Figure 2.1 demonstrates the association between urban productivity and city size 
(on the left), and the association between urban productivity and skill ratio (on the 
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right), in 1980 and in 2010. Skill ratio is the population ratio of college graduates and 
above divided by workers without college degrees. As can be seen, larger cities are 
more educated both in 1980 and 2010. Moreover, the association between urban size 
and productivity has not changed much during the past three decades. In 2010, the 
association between urban productivity and skill ratio surged much more than that in 
1980. These imply that higher educated workers are more likely to provoke higher 
productivity because the manufacturing-oriented economy has transformed to a 
knowledge-based economy in which innovation and advanced technology are the 
drivers of economic growth. These also suggest that productivity externality by skill 
ratio becomes more important nowadays than in 1980. 
Amenities may also be more abundant in larger and higher educated cities since 
urban size and skill composition explain amenities. Between 1980 and 2010, amenity 
externality by skill ratio may become stronger due to the concentration of higher 
educated people. The change in externalities also shapes change in allocations of 
skilled workers endogenously over these years.  
The distributions of location fundamentals across cities and their correlations also 
changed from 1980. More productive cities may become more amenable, less 
excessively frictional (i.e. public sector inefficiency), and especially more amenable 
for high-skill workers. These changes also affect location choices of heterogeneous 
workers and affect endogenous productivity externalities and amenity externalities. 
Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013), referred to as D-RH thereafter provides a 
general equilibrium model to account for the allocation of a given population of 
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homogeneous workers across a given set of urban locations distinguished by their 
exogenous local fundamentals with respect to productivity, amenity, and urban 
friction. These location fundamentals define the geography. The urban friction serves 
as a labor wedge that reduces consumption relative to labor income and is increasing 
with local population size. The productivity fundamental determines local labor 
demand, the amenity fundamental determines local labor supply, and the friction 
regulates urban population sizes so that the welfare of the perfectly mobile workers is 
equalized across all populated urban locations. This essay adapts this tractable and 
intuitive model to the case where the economy is endowed with two types of workers: 
high-skill workers (college graduates and above) and low-skill workers (those without 
college degrees). The imperfect substitutability between the human capital service of 
high-skill and of low-skill workers is captured by urban productivity in the GDL 
framework, which enables the mapping between local productivity and amenity 
fundamentals, on one hand, and wage rates and skill ratio, on the other hand.  
Calibrating the model with U.S. metro area data in 1980 and 2010, and identifying 
the model parameters and location fundamentals, essay 2 first show how dispersion in 
each of the location fundamentals, with respect to productivity, general amenity, 
high-skill amenity and excess friction respectively, affects the dispersion of skill ratio 
across cities and the wage and welfare inequalities, with and without endogenous 
urban size and education externality effects. Essay 2 then evaluate the relative change 
in wage inequality and welfare inequality between 1980 and 2010, examining the 
contributions of different factors, including changes in the location fundamentals, in 
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market thickness and education externality effects, and in the aggregate human capital 
endowment.  
By shutting down the dispersion in productivity fundamental, general amenity 
fundamental, excess friction fundamental and high-skill preferred amenity 
fundamental, respectively, this study utilizes counterfactual exercises to assess the 
contribution of each type of location fundamental to uneven skill concentration and 
welfare gap using U.S. metro area data in 2010. The goal of the analysis is not only to 
evaluate the relative magnitude of nominal wage inequality versus welfare inequality 
but also to examine more systematically how geography influences these inequalities. 
The GDL urban accounting model, which is presented below, enables the influence of 
geography on these inequalities to be studied through an array of counterfactual 
exercises under various model parameter settings. These parameters capture the 
substitutability between high-skill and low-skill of human capital service, the state of 
urban transport technology, the importance of local market thickness for high-skill 
human capital service and for consumer amenities, and skill difference in WTP for 
general amenities. These factors make the geography influence on wage and welfare 
inequalities highly complex, as the location incentives of high-skill and low-skill 
workers depend on each other and depend on geography through multiple channels of 
interactions. 
The equilibrium properties of the GDL urban accounting model are studied using 
the Taylor Expansion method. Welfare gap is affected by the second order derivatives 
of the heterogeneous skilled population with respect to location attributes, correlations 
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between location attributes, and the dispersions in location attributes across cities.  
In the absence of externalities, I find that more dispersion in productivity predicts 
narrower welfare gap although it enhances skill concentration. It implies that low-skill 
workers may benefit from skill concentration in the GDL framework, and the reason 
may be the interdependence between high-skill and low-skill workers. Different 
externalities allow location fundamentals to contribute differently to skill 
concentration and welfare gap. More high-skill supply facilitates intensive skill 
concentration (in all the counterfactual exercises); and either with only productivity 
externalities or with all externalities, welfare gap is wider than that in reality.  
I find that as more externalities take effects, the correlation between nominal wage 
gap and welfare gap becomes smaller and smaller and even negative. In reality (i.e. all 
externalities are present), more skill concentration is concurrent with larger welfare 
gap. In the presence of amenity externalities, I also find that the role of amenities 
outperforms the role of productivity. It also is found that skill concentration benefits 
low-skill workers in reality.  
I find that either change in location fundamentals or changes in skilled population 
endowments account for more skill concentration and wider welfare gap while the 
change in externalities widens welfare gap but weakens skill concentration. I also find 
that nominal wage gap change is not a reliable indicator of welfare gap change. 
Intensive skill concentration is concurrent with wider welfare gap between 1980 and 
2010.  
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This essay links to the literature of changed urban economies. In Shapiro (2006), 
enhanced productivity growth and rapid improvement of the quality of life cause local 
area employment growth from 1940 to 1990. Accounting studies such as Yoon (2013) 
and Brinkman (2014) are closely related. Yoon (2013) studies causes and welfare 
consequences of the Rustbelt decline in the framework of dynamic spatial equilibrium, 
and finds that Rustbelt decline is largely due to the reduction of location advantage in 
the goods-producing sector; welfare inequality between the Rustbelt and other regions 
could be significantly mitigated by reducing mobility barriers. Brinkman (2014) 
decomposes skill concentration change and economy structural transformation from 
1980 to 2010 by both industry-specific technology change and skill-specific 
technology change. He finds that supply and demand for high-skill workers increase 
compared with low-skill ones, moreover, high-skill demand rises faster than their 
supply.  
This essay does not predict the absolute change of welfare inequality between 
1980 and 2010; instead, it focuses on assessing the contribution of change in each 
determinant. The nominal wage gap in every city should be smaller than welfare gap 
as in Diamond (2015), as long as high-skill workers have a larger WTP for general 
amenities. For a place-based policy that induces heterogeneously spatial distortion 
(Kline & Moretti, 2013) and national policy to which heterogeneous spaces respond 
differently (Albouy & Hanson, 2014), their impacts on mobility responses of skilled 
workers and social welfare gap could be expounded through counterfactual exercises 
in the GDL urban accounting framework.  
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2.2 The GDL Urban Accounting Model 
2.2.1 The setting 
Essay 2 adapts the urban accounting model of Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013) 
to an economy with heterogeneous workers differentiated by their skill levels, the 
contributions of whose human capital service to metro area GDP are aggregated using 
the GDL production function of Jones (2014). I first adapt the urban economic setting 
of Desmet and Ross-Hansberg (2013) to the case of two worker types and then 
incorporate the GDL technology to derive the equilibrium across cities. The term 
metro area and city will be used interchangeably in the present paper. 
Our economy is endowed with a population size N , which is made up of 1L  
low-skill workers and 2L  high-skill workers. The aggregate skill ratio is 2 1s L L= . 
The economy has J  city locations and the workers will be endogenously distributed 
across these locations. The population in these locations, indexed by j  must satisfy 
the following endowment constraints:  
( )1 2 1 2 1 2
1 1 1 1
J J J J
j j j j j
j j j j
N N L L L L L L
= = = =
= = + = + = +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑         (2.1)   
As in D-RH, each worker in city j , differentiated in the present model by skill 
type i  ( i =1 indicating low-skill workers, 2, high-skill workers), is endowed with 
one unit of labor and he consumes a numeraire traded good of quantity ijc , leisure 
1 ijl−  , where ijl  is a fraction denoting labor supply for employment (equivalent to 
employment participation rate per household), and an amenity index ijγ  offered by 
the city, to receive utility: 
( ) ( )log log 1 , 1,2i ij ij iju c l iψ γ= + − + =              (2.2)                          
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where ψ  is a parameter of preference for leisure. Housing consumption is fixed and 
thus does not need to enter the utility function. iu  is independent of location because, 
in equilibrium, every city must offer the same utility for each type of workers.  
Each worker receives a wage rate of 1 jw  dollar per unit of labor, pays a wage tax 
of jτ  cents per dollar for local public services, and incurs housing and commuting 
cost of ij ijR T+ , to have a budget constraint
21: 
( ) ( )1 , 1,2ij ij ij j ij ijc w l R T iτ= − − + =              (2.3)                             
Note that the same local tax rate jτ  is assumed to apply to both high-skill and 
low-skill workers but the amenity index is allowed to be different between the 
workers types to reflex different preferences for local amenity.  
As in D-RH, I adopt the assumption of a monocentric city, so that, with fixed 
housing consumption, ij ijR T+  is invariant within the city for each type of workers. 
The commuting cost is determined by the opportunity cost of labor for commuting, 
which is proportional to the distance traveled, the commuting speed, the wage rate, 
and the employment participation. The housing bid-rent gradient is thus proportional 
to ij ijw l . I further assume that the residential density for low-skill workers, 1 jn , is 
greater than that for high-skill workers, 2 jn , such that 1 1 1 2 2 2j j j j j jw l n w l n=  and hence 
the land bid-rent gradient is equalized between the worker types. This assumption 
precludes income sorting across locations in the city and allows fully mixed 
residential land use and a common commuting boundary jd  for both worker types.  
                                                             
21 Any capital income and expenditure would offset each other in steady state and thus would not 
affect the budget constraint. 
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The boundary distance to CBD can be determined by the equation of land 
utilization and land area available for residential use in the city. Assuming the built-up 
area to be pie-shaped that occupies jκ′  fraction of the circular area jdπ  and a 1b  
fraction of the pie area to be occupied by low-skill workers, I have:   
2
1 1 1jj j jb d n Lκ π′ = ， ( )
2
1 2 21 jj j jb d n Lκ π′− =             (2.4)      
As will be verified below, a common preference parameter ψ  for leisure entails
1 2j jl l= . Thus, Eq.(2.4) gives  
1
2
1
j
j
j j
L
d
n κ π
 
=   ′ 
                       (2.5)   
where ( )1 2 1 2j j j j jL L w w L= + represents low-skill equivalent labor supply. Further, 
assume a labor cost of jκ′′  units per unit commuting distance and a zero opportunity 
cost of urban land at the commuting boundary. Thus, the combined housing and 
commuting for each worker type, which equals the commuting cost at the urban 
boundary, is given by jij ij ij ij jR T w l dκ′′+ = . Substituting this expression and Eq.(2.3) 
into Eq.(2.2), I have the first-order condition for ijl : 
1
1
ij
ij
l
l
ψ
=
−
 
which implies ( )1 1ijl ψ= + 22. 
To determine the local labor tax rate jτ , I again follow D-RH in assuming local 
public expenditure to be proportional to total commuting cost in the city, jTC , which, 
given the mixed density at every distance, is determined by      
                                                             
22 D-RH incorrectly equates ij ijR T+  with jj dκ ′′  instead of jij ij jw l dκ ′′  and derives an incorrect 
solution for ijl . See Fu and Zhang (2015) for further details about the correction. 
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( )( )
( )( )
( )
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 20
3
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
2 1
2 1
3
2
3
jd
j j j j j j j j
jj j j j j j j j j
jj j j j j j j
TC x b n w l b n w l xdx
b n w l b n w l d
w l L w l L d
π κ κ
πκ κ
κ
′ ′′= + −
′ ′′= + −
′′= +
∫
      (2.6) 
I have made use of Eq.(2.4) in the last equation. The balanced local public 
budget is given by 
( ) ( )1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 223 jj j j j j j j j j j j j j j j j jw l L w l L g TC g w l L w l L dτ κ′ ′ ′′+ = = +    (2.7)         
where jg′  represents the efficiency of the local public sector. Eq.(2.7) implies that 
2
3
jj j jg dτ κ′ ′′= . Thus, the workers’ budget constraint can be rewritten: 
( )21 exp , 1,23 j j jij ij ij j j j ij ijc w l g d d w l iκ κ τ
 ′ ′′ ′′= − − = − = 
 
        (2.8)          
where  
( ) ( )
( )
1
2
1
1 2
1
2 32log log 1 1 ,
3 3
j jij ij j
j j j j j j j
ij j j
j j
gw l L
g g L g
c n n
κ
τ κ κ κ
κ π κ π
  ′ ′′+    ′ ′′ ′′≡ = − − + ≈ =       ′     ′ 
  (2.9) 
jτ  is thus a generalized labor wedge relating to the private and public cost of urban 
commuting23. κ  is a parameter to capture the general rate at which jτ  increases 
with the square root of urban size in terms of low-skill equivalent labor supply jL . 
jg  is a location fundamental variable, labeled as excess friction, to capture the 
cross-city variation in the labor wedge due to variations in commuting speed ( jκ′′ ), in 
public sector efficiency ( jg′ ), in housing supply constraints ( jκ′ ), and in built-up 
density ( 1 jn )
24. κ  and jg  can be estimated using the following regression equation 
derived from applying logarithm to Eq.(2.9): 
                                                             
23 jτ  is defined as an exponential discount to prevent possible negative consumption ijc  in 
counterfactual simulation. 
24 In D-RH the excess friction captures only the cross-city variation in public service efficiency. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1log log log log2j j jL gτ κ= + +
              (2.10)                   
with the restriction that the mean of ( )log jg  equals zero. 
Based on the budget constraint Eq.(2.8), the worker utility can be written as: 
  ( )
1
2log , 1,2i i ij j j iju u w g L iψ κ γ≡ − = − + =             (2.11)                  
where  ( ) ( ) ( )log 1 log 1ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ≡ − + + . The welfare inequality between high-skill 
and low-skill workers is given by 
  ( )22 12 1 2 1
1
log i j j
i
wu u u u u
w
γ γ
 
∆ ≡ − = − = + − 
 
          (2.12)                     
With a GDL production function (Jones, 2014), the output (GDP) of city j  is 
produced by capital jK  and aggregate human capital service jH :                 
                  1j j jY K H
α α−=                       (2.13) 
where α  is the elasticity of output with respect to jH . jH  aggregates the human 
capital service of low-skill workers, 1 1 jh L , where 1h  is assumed to invariant across 
cities, and that of high-skill workers, 1 2 2j jh h L , where 2 jh  depends on location 
fundamentals. The dependence of 2 jh  on location fundamentals reflects the fact that 
specialization (high-skill) makes productivity more dependent on the extent of the 
market. The aggregation is given by: 
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 11 1
1 1 1 2 2 1 1 21j j j j j j jH h L h h L h L h s
ε ε
ε ε εε ε
ε ε ε
− − −− −   
= + = +   
   
    (2.14) 
where 1ε >  is the elasticity of substitution between the service of low-skill 
workers and that of high-skill workers and 2 1j j js L L≡  is the skill ratio for the 
city j . 
The wage rate of low-skill workers, determined by the marginal product of 1 jL , is 
given by: 
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( )
1 1
1 1 2
1
1j jj j j
j j
Y H
w h h s
H L
ε
ε ε
ε
α
j
− −∂  
= = + ∂  
             (2.15) 
where ( )
11
1j jY H r
αα
ααα j α α
−− −
= ≡ −  when the marginal product of capital 
equalized across cities and equal to the interest rate r . Similarly, the wage rate of 
high-skill workers is given by: 
( )
1 1 1 1
2 1 2 2
2
1j jj j j j j
j j
Y H
w h h s h s
H L
ε
ε ε ε
ε ε ε
α
j
− − −−∂  
= = + ∂  
         (2.16) 
The human capital service of high-skill workers relative to that of low-skill workers,
2 jh , which is not directly observed, can be inferred, according to Eq.(2.15) and (2.16), 
from observed wage ratio 2 1j j jw wλ =  and skill ratio js : 
1 1
2j j jh s
ε
ε ελ
−
−
= , or 
1
1 1
2 j j jh s
ε
ε ελ − −=                  (2.17)                       
2.2.2  Equilibrium 
The equilibrium of the economy, with J  city locations and aggregate 
endowment of population N  and skill ratio 2 1s L L= , is characterized by the 
observable city-level endogenous variables { }1 1 2, , , , , ,jj j j j j j
j J
A N s w λ τ γ γ
∈
=   plus 
the two economy-wide endogenous variables 1u  and u∆ . The city-level 
endogenous variables in the set A  are, respectively, population, skill ratio, low-skill 
wage rate, nominal wage gap, generalized labor wedge, low-skill amenity index, and 
high-skill amenity index. These endogenous variables will be determined by a set of 
location fundamentals, a set of model parameters, as well as equilibrium values of 1u  
and u∆  that ensures satisfaction of the endowment constraint Eq.(2.1).   
The location fundamentals include excess friction jg , defined in Eq.(2.10) in 
relation to the generalized labor wedge, productivity fundamental ja , general 
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amenity fundamental jρ , and high-skill amenity fundamental jδ . The last three 
fundamental variables are defined below. The productivity fundamental is linked to 
high-skill human capital service: 
2
N s
j j j jh a N s
η η=                       (2.18) 
where the fundamental variable ja  captures location advantages, such as access to 
global market and urban forms conducive to face-to-face contacts, and parameters 
Nη  and sη  capture the possible influence of endogenous agglomeration economies 
on high-skill human capital service. The amenity fundamentals are linked to amenity 
indexes in Eq.(2.11). Specifically, I assume: 
                          ( )1 logj j N jNγ ρ ζ= +                   (2.19) 
                          ( )2 1 logj j s j jsγ ωγ ζ δ= + +                 (2.20)  
Where 1 jγ  is the index of general amenities which are preferred by both high-skill 
and low-skill workers, sζ  captures the possible influence of education concentration 
on amenities consumed by high-skill, Nζ  captures the possible influence of 
agglomeration on amenity, 1ω >  reflects the greater valuation of local amenities by 
high-skill workers (Lee, 2010), jδ  represents high-skill preferred amenities in the 
city j . 
To compute the equilibrium solution, I first solve { },j j j JN s ∈ , 1u , and u∆  
jointly. Other endogenous variables can be computed directly. In addition, 1 jL , 2 jL , 
and jL  can be computed: 
( )21 2 1 2
1
, , 1
1 1 1
j j j j j
j j j j j j j
j j j j
N s N w N
L L L L L s
s s w s
λ= = = + = +
+ + +
     (2.21)   
Proposition 2.1 shows the existence of equilibrium solution by construction. 
80 
 
Proposition 2.1: Existence of equilibrium solution 
Given (i) aggregate endowment of population N  and skill ratio s , (ii) J  city 
locations with fundamentals { }, , ,j j j j j Jg a ρ δ ∈ , and (iii) the parameter set 
{ }1, , , , , , ,N s N shκ j ε η η ζ ζ ω , there is a unique set of solutions to the endogenous 
variables { }1 1 2, , , , , ,jj j j j j j
j J
A N s w λ τ γ γ
∈
=  , 1u , and u∆ .  
Using Eq.(2.11), (2.15), (2.17), (2.19) and (2.21), I have:  
 ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
1
21 1 1
11
1 21
1 2
1
1 1 2
1 1
1
log
log 1 1 log
1
1log log 1 1
1 1
log
N s N s
j j j j
j
j j j j j j N j
j
j
j j j j j j j
j
j N j
u w g L
N
h h s g s N
s
N
h a N s g a N s
s
N
ε ε
ε
ε ε
η η η ηε ε
κ γ
j κ λ ρ ζ
j κ
ε
ρ ζ
− −
− −
+ +
= − +
     = + − + + +     +     
    
= + + − +     − +    
+ +
  (2.22) 
Using Eq.(2.12), (2.17), (2.19) and (2.20), I have: 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2 1
1
log
1 1log log 1 1 log logN s
j
j j
j
j j j j j N j s j j
w
u
w
a N s s N sη η
γ γ
ε
ω ρ ω ζ ζ δ
ε ε
 
∆ = + −  
 
−
= − + − + − + +
(2.23) 
Eq.(2.22) and (2.23) solve jN  and js  as a function of 1u , u∆ , the location 
fundamentals and the parameter set. The equilibrium values of 1u  and u∆  can be 
determined using the endowment constraints: 
1
1 1
J
j
j j
N
L
s=
=
+∑                       (2.24) 
                    2
1 1
J
j j
j j
s N
L
s=
=
+∑                       (2.25) 
The rest of the endogenous variables can be computed directly: using Eq.(2.15) 
and (2.18) for 1 jw , Eq.(2.17) and (2.18) for jλ , Eq.(2.10) for jτ , Eq.(2.19) for 1 jγ , 
and (2.20) for 2 jγ .  
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2.2.3  Determination of welfare gap: Taylor Expansion method 
Proposition 2.2: welfare inequality 
To show how welfare inequality may change in equilibrium, I first examine the 
case without endogenous agglomeration and externality effects, i.e., with
0N s N sη η ζ ζ= = = = . From (2.12) and (2.17), I have 
( )1 j ju
j e
ω ρ δλ ∆ − − −=  and
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 1 11
2 2
j j u
j j j j j j js h s h a e
ε ε ε δ ω ρεελ λ
−
− − + − −∆−= = = . Then from Eq.(2.21) and (2.22), 
I have 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
21
1
1 1
1
21
1 1 11
1 1
1 11
ˆlog log 11 1
1 1
ˆlog log 1 1
1
j j
j j
j j j
j j
j j j j j
u
j j
u
j j
h s u
L L
s g s
h a e u
g a e
ε
ε δ ω ρ εε
ε δ ω ρε
j λ ρ
λ κ λ
j ρ
κ
−
− + − −∆ −−
− + − −∆−
 
+ + + − 
= =  + + 
 
 
 + + + −
 =
  + 
 
(2.26) 
Similarly, 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
21
1
1 1
2
21
1 1 11 111 1
1 11
ˆlog log 1
1 1
ˆlog log 1
1
j j
j j
j j
j j jj j
j j
j j j j j
u u
j j j
u
j j
h s us s
L L
s g s
h a e u a e
g a e
ε
ε δ ω ρ εε ε δ ω ρε
ε δ ω ρε
j λ ρ
λ κ λ
j ρ
κ
−
− + − −∆ −− + − −∆−
− + − −∆−
 
+ + + − 
= =  + + 
 
 
 + + + −
 =
  + 
 
  (2.27) 
It can be verified that 1 jL  decreases with 1u , κ , and jg . And, with 2 1ε> > , it 
increases with j jsλ  and hence increases with ja , jδ , and jρ  but decreases with 
u∆ . 2 jL  behaves similarly except that it is more sensitive to changes in u∆  
because js  also decreases with u∆ .  
Applying quadratic Taylor expansion around the cross-city mean location 
fundamentals to Eq.(2.26) and (2.27), I can express the endowment constraints as: 
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
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   (2.28) 
and 


2
2
1
2, 2,2, 2,2, 2,2 2 2 2
2
2, 2,2,2,
2 2
1
2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
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ρρ ρδδ
ρ δ ρ ρ
ρ δρδδ
δ δ ρ ρ ρδ ρ δ δ δ
s s s s s s s s
s s s s s s s s
=
=
′′ ′′′′ ′′′′ ′′ 
+ + + + + 
 = +
′′ ′′′′′′ 
+ + + + 
 
= + ∆
∑
   (2.29)   
where 1L  and  2L  are the values of 1 jL  and 2 jL , respectively, at the mean 
location fundamentals and baseline equilibrium 1u  and u∆ . 1L∆  and 2L∆  are 
functions of the curvature of 1 jL  and 2 jL , respectively, with respect to the location 
fundamental variables and the cross-city variance and covariance among these 
exogenous variables. Thus increased dispersion in a location fundamental that 
increases the value of 1L∆  and 2L∆  will require offsetting changes in 1u  or in 
u∆  to reduce 1L  and  2L , in order to the keep the endowment constraints satisfied. 
The impact of 1L∆  and 2L∆  on the equilibrium values of 1u  and u∆  can be 
illustrated by diagrams in Figure 2.2 and 2.3. The diagrams plot the isoquant curves 
for 1L  and  2L  with respect to 1u  and u∆ . Since 2 jL  is more sensitive to 
changes in u∆ , the  2L  isoquant curve (dotted curve) is relatively steeper than the 
1L  isoquant curve (solid curve). In addition, an increase in 1L∆  and 2L∆  will shift 
the 1L  and  2L  isoquant curves, respectively, up to the right, since 1L  and  2L  are 
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decreasing in 1u  and u∆ . The equilibrium 1u  and u∆  are determined by the 
intersection of the 1L  and  2L  isoquant curves. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3: 1L  movement and  2L  movement 
In Figure 2.2, the initial equilibrium is  1u′  and u′∆ , corresponding to the 
isoquant curves determined by 1L′∆  and 2L′∆ . An increase in 1L′∆  to 1L′′∆  moves 
the intersection along the  2L  isoquant curve up to the left, resulting in new 
equilibrium welfare outcome,  1u′′  and u′′∆ ,  characterized by a higher utility for 
low-skill workers and a lower welfare inequality. In Figure 2.3, an increase in 2L′∆  
to 2L′′′∆  moves the intersection along the 1L  isoquant curve down to the right, 
resulting in new equilibrium welfare outcome,  1u′′′  and u′′′∆ ,  characterized by a 
lower utility for low-skill workers and a higher welfare inequality.  
2.3  Accounting for cross-sectional variation: 2010 
The geographic units are metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) based on the year 
2003 definition by Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The main data source 
of this study is the 5% sample of the 2010 U.S. Census of Population and Housing, 
and it is conveniently obtained from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series 
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(IPUMS)-USA25. Variable constructions and data source details are seen in Essay 2 
Appendix I. 
2.3.1  Calibration of location fundamentals and parameters: 2010 
Before applying the model to data, I summarize in Table 2.1 the equations for 
calibrating the location fundamentals { }, , ,j j j j j Jg a ρ δ ∈ , given the observed 
endogenous variables { }1 1 2, , , , , ,jj j j j j j
j J
A N s w λ τ γ γ
∈
=   and the parameter set
{ }1, , , , , , ,N s N shκ j ε η η ζ ζ ω . 
Table 2.1: Equations for computing location fundamentals 
Location 
fundamental 
Computation 
Reference 
equations 
jg  
1
1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2
log logij ij j j j j j jj j j
ij j j j j
w l w l L w l L
g L
c c L c L
τ κ
   +
= = =      +   
  Eq.(2.9) 
and (2.10) 
ja  
1
1 1
2
N s
j j j j j jh s a N s
ε
η ηε ελ − −= =  
Eq.( 2.17) 
and (2.18) 
jρ  
 ( ) ( )
1
211 1log logj j j j j N ju w g L Nγ κ ρ ζ= − + = +  
where 1 12u =  can be chosen as a positive integer such 
that the minimum 1 jγ  is non-negative. 
Eq.(2.11) 
and (2.19) 
jδ  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
1
2
1 1
log 1 log
ˆlog 1 log log
j j s j j
j j j j s j j
u s
u w g L s
λ ω γ ζ δ
λ ω κ ζ δ
∆ = + − + +
 
= + − − + + + 
 
where 1u∆ =  can be chosen as a positive number such 
that the mean jδ  is about zero.  
Eq.(2.12) 
and (2.20) 
Urban productivity is measured by adapting the GDL approach to the urban 
                                                             
25 IPUMS is by Ruggles et al. (2010). 
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context as in essay 1, and it is specified structurally as in essay 1: ja  captures the 
composite impacts of all location fundamentals to urban productivity. Amenity 
externality by urban size affects low-skill workers’ consumption of general amenities. 
A high-skill worker’ consumption of amenities includes general amenities, amenity 
externalities induced by both urban size and skill ratio, and high-skill preferred 
amenities. Low-skill utility level 1u  is normalized at 12, and welfare gap u∆  at 1. 
The set of model parameters is{ }1, , , , , , ,N s N shκ j ε η η ζ ζ ω . The descriptions of 
these parameters and their estimations are summarized in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Model parameters and their estimation equation 
Parameter Description 
Estimation 
equation(s) 
Value 
κ  General commuting cost parameter Eq.(2.10) 0.0005 
( )1log ,hj ε  
Low-skill productivity constant and 
elasticity of substitution between worker 
types 
Eq.( 2.15) 
9.25, 
1.6 
,N sη η  
The agglomeration economy coefficient by 
population and human capital externality 
coefficient by skill ratio 
Eq.( 2.18) 
(Table 1.13) 
0.072, 
1.445 
, ,N sζ ζ ω  
The agglomeration economy coefficients by 
population and education for amenity, and 
high-skill valuation of general amenities 
Eq.( 2.19) and 
(2.20) 
0.16, 
0.7, 1.7 
   Productivity externality by urban size and productivity externality by skill 
composition (i.e. human capital externality) use the same estimation values from the 
averaged one-year sample (2005-2012) of essay 1 (Table 1.13).  
2.3.2  Counterfactual exercises 
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The impacts of dispersions in location fundamentals on endogenous urban 
outcomes are studied via counterfactual exercises in which dispersions in location 
fundamentals are shut down. By giving the standard deviation of each location 
attribute a zero value respectively, essay 2 computes the counterfactual welfare gaps 
without externalities using the method of Taylor Expansion in 2010. By equaling 
location fundamental to its population-weighted average, essay 2 also perform 
counterfactual exercises using the equilibrium conditions. 
The threshold of a city’s counterfactual total population to determine whether a 
city exists is 2600, which is 3000 in Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013) multiplied by 
the mean of labor force share26. In the following counterfactual Tables, cities that are 
too small to be existed are not taken into account. 
I first calibrate the model with all externality parameters equaling to zero in the 
first two numerical exercises. Exercises 3 to 5 perform exercises with presences of 
productivity externalities and amenity externalities. 
2.3.2.1 Exercise 1: Taylor Expansion, without externalities 
Exercise 1 reports the counterfactual low-skill utility levels and welfare gaps 
when the dispersions in location fundamentals are individually shut down when 
aggregate population endowment is increased by 10 percent, and when total skill ratio 
endowment is increased by 10 percent. The baseline case is that all cities are 
heterogeneous in all location fundamentals, i.e. the standard deviation (std) of each 
location fundamental ≠  0. Essay 2 Appendix Table 1 shows the standard deviations 
                                                             
26 Mean of labor force ratio = 1 – mean of old people share. 2600 = 3000 * (1 - mean of old 
people share in 2010). 
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of location fundamentals and correlations between any two location fundamentals in 
baseline case in 2010. It is found that more productive cities are less desirable in 
general amenities, less excessively frictional, and more abundant in high-skill 
preferred amenities. 
Baseline 1L  and  2L  are decomposed into 1L J , 1L∆ , 2L J , and 2L∆ . 
Counterfactual 1L∆  and 2L∆  are computed by shutting down the standard deviation 
of individual location fundamentals, and then counterfactual 1u  and u∆  are solved 
for 1L  and  2L  such that 1 1 1L L J L= − ∆  and  2 2 2L L J L= − ∆ , according to 
equations (2.26) and (2.27) in which 1u  is a function of 1L  and  2L  (so is u∆ ). 
For the last two rows (i.e. increasing total population by 10%, and increasing skill 
ratio by 10%), the counterfactual 1L J  and 2L J  are computed and then 1u  and 
u∆  are solved for the counterfactual values of 1L  and  2L . 
Exercise 1: Taylor Expansion approximation: 0N s N sη η ζ ζ= = = = , 2010 
Scenario 1L   2L  1u  u∆  
Baseline std( jg ), std( ja ),std( jρ ),std( jδ ) 291985 227039 12 1 
std( jg )=0 518512 411840 12.2785 0.882 
std( ja )=0 199279 222783 12.4218 1.1374 
std( jρ )=0 166549 28438.8 11.7431 0.8784 
std( jδ )=0 324026 291394 11.6948 0.9317 
Increase total population N  by 10% 336105 262617 11.7655 0.9795 
Increase aggregate skill ratio s  by 10% 273131 245893 12.1869 0.949 
Note: Take low-skill population for example, the residual is the difference between actual 1L∆  
(the curvatures of 1 jL  w.r.t. location fundamentals) and the calculated 1L∆  using Taylor 
88 
 
Expansion equation (2.28). Residual of high-skill equation (2.29) is  2L∆ =308651.2; residual of 
low-skill equation (2.28) is 1L∆ =149664. Above counterfactual values of 1L  and  2L  include the 
Taylor expansion residual respectively. 
Compared with the baseline case, counterfactual 1L  and  2L  both are bigger in 
counterfactual excess friction jg  case, counterfactual jδ  case, and counterfactual 
N  case. They both are smaller in the counterfactual ja  case and counterfactual jρ  
case. In these cases, the alternations of low-skill utility level and welfare gap 
compared with the baseline case are unable to be predicted using Figures 2.2 and 2.3. 
For the counterfactual s  case, 1L  becomes smaller but  2L  becomes bigger 
compared with those in the baseline case. According to Figures 2.2 and 2.3, 1L  
isoquant curve shifts upward but  2L  isoquant curve shifts downward, the new 
intersection of these two curves shows a bigger low-skill utility level but a smaller 
welfare gap. 
In the absence of externalities, relatively more supply of high-skill workers does 
not generate externality. That high-skill demand curve is shifted downward due to 
larger high-skill supply outperforms the nonexistent externality, so increasing skill 
ratio endowment generates a narrower nominal wage gap. With the unchanged 
difference between two skill groups’ consumptions of amenities, a narrower nominal 
wage gap implies a narrower welfare gap according to equation (2.23). 
The following counterfactual exercises are performed respectively with an even 
distribution of location fundamental, i.e. each location fundamental respectively 
equals to its population weighted average. Simulation results including 1 jL , 2 jL , 1u  
and u∆  are obtained to satisfy equilibrium conditions, i.e. Eq. (2.22)-(2.25). Other 
endogenous variables could be calculated based on the equilibrium values of 1 jL , 
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2 jL , 1u  and u∆ 27. 
2.3.2.2 Exercise 2: without externalities 
   In the absence of all externalities (productivity externalities and amenity 
externalities), counterfactual low-skill utility levels, counterfactual welfare gaps, 
counterfactual skill ratio dispersions, and counterfactual nominal wage gaps are 
reported in Exercise 2.   
Shutting down the dispersion in excess friction lowers the dispersion in skill ratio 
distribution (i.e. less skill concentration) and reduces welfare inequality; meanwhile, 
mean of the nominal wage gap is narrower. As can be seen in Essay 2 Appendix Table 
2 that shows the correlations among urban size, skill ratio location fundamentals for 
actual and counterfactual cases, in reality, higher educated cities are more populated, 
more productive, less desirable in general amenities, less excessively frictional, more 
desirable in high-skill preferred amenities. Once eliminating the advantage of small 
excess friction ( jg ) in those higher educated cities, people migrate to where general 
amenities are abundant. Especially when high-skill workers have larger WTP for 
general urban amenities, their relatively large movement to these previously lower 
educated cities causes less skill concentration. Mean nominal wage gap jλ  declines 
because of high-skill workers’ migration to these previously less productive cities. 
                                                             
27  D-RH solves a counterfactual equilibrium with chosen initial values of  jN  being the 
observations, thus population reallocation is the fewest and the time to find the counterfactual 
solutions is the shortest. In essay 2, I let Matlab with the built-in function automatically choose the 
most efficient solution. Taking into account of the possibility of multiple equilibria and that fewest 
reallocations may lead to errors, I initialize the search with random values of 1 jL  and 2 jL . 
Therefore Maltab would find the best matches to keep the flow of computations going on, until 
( )1 1L counterfactual L−  and ( )2 2L counterfactual L−  are sufficiently small.  
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Other location fundamentals are not shocked in this case, so welfare gap u∆  is 
shrunken according to equation (2.23). The loss of productivity dominates gain in 
amenities. However mean low-skill wage rises, and one reason might be that in those 
previously more productive cities low-skill workers are even scarcer. The average 
counterfactual jτ  is lower than in the baseline, thus, on average people are suffering 
less urban frictions. Higher mean counterfactual 1 jw  and lower mean counterfactual 
jτ  explains higher 1u .   
Exercise 2: Without externalities: 0N s N sη η ζ ζ= = = = , 2010 
Scenario 1u  u∆  std( js )   mean( jλ )   
Baseline location fundamentals 12 1 0.2497485 1.645306 
Without dispersion in jg  12.1342 0.8919 0.2102759 1.483658 
Without dispersion in ja   12.0362 1.1027 0.0321217 1.811234 
Without dispersion in jρ   11.8029 0.8882 0.1394747 1.595331 
Without dispersion in jδ  11.9048 0.9785 0.0541201 1.513475 
Increase total population N  by 10% 11.9827 0.994 0.2489799 1.635572 
Increase aggregate skill ratio s  by 10% 12.0331 0.9431 0.2703713 1.554399 
Dispersion in productivity predicts narrower welfare gap although more skill 
concentration. Productivity and general amenities are negatively correlated in the 
baseline (Essay 2 Appendix Table 2). Losing the advantage of productivity in large 
and educated cities by equalizing productivity, high-skill workers choose to locate 
where they can enjoy desirable amenities. The counterfactual correlations show that in 
larger and higher educated cities, general amenities are more abundant, excess 
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frictions are higher, and high-skill preferred amenities are a little bit less bountiful. 
There are even more high-skill workers reallocating to cities previously with more 
general amenities, than in the counterfactual jg  case, so the dispersion in skill ratio 
is smaller. With the equalized urban productivity and the smaller dispersion in skill 
ratios js  (i.e. suggests no big skill ratio in all cities), nominal wage gaps adjust to be 
higher, so as to satisfy the urban productivity equation (2.17). Welfare gap thus is 
expanded relative to the baseline case. In this scenario, urban friction jτ  is more 
unevenly distributed with a much higher mean, implying that low-skill workers in 
those previously less excessively frictional cities suffer smaller losses; compared with 
the baseline that more low-skill workers suffer friction losses in those previously 
more excessively frictional cities, low-skill utility rises in the counterfactual ja  case. 
Heterogeneity in jρ  across cities increases skill concentration, welfare gap, 
low-skill utility and nominal wage gap, relative to the baseline case. So it is the case 
with equalized jδ . The previously higher educated cities gain advantages in general 
amenities in the counterfactual jρ  case, so with 
( )1 j ju
j e
ω ρ δλ ∆ − − −= , the nominal 
wage gap is shrunken. Also, the mean counterfactual amenity consumption difference 
between high-skill and low-skill workers is smaller (i.e. 0.43) than in the baseline (i.e. 
0.51). Therefore, welfare inequality is reduced. The correlation between 
counterfactual skill ratio js  and urban population jN  is much higher than in 
baseline (seen in Essay 2 Appendix Table 2), because less abundant jρ  is the only 
disadvantage that higher educated cities have, once it is eliminated, these cities will 
attract more low-skill workers in spite of larger urban frictions jτ . This also gives a 
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hint that college towns (i.e. smaller jN  but higher js ) may be amenable in general 
amenities, eliminating this advantage generates relatively more high-skill 
out-migrations to larger cities. 
In the equalized jδ  case, higher educated cities are more productive, more 
desirable in general amenities but more frictional. Compared with the counterfactual 
case, in actual high-skill workers move more of them to cities which are relatively 
less livable in terms of general amenities but more livable in terms of high-skill 
preferred amenities than low-skill workers. The reason might be the higher WTP for 
general amenities and specific preference over certain amenities by high-skill workers. 
Meanwhile, these places are less excessively frictional but more productive (i.e. 
correlation coefficient between skill ratio and productivity is much higher in actual 
than in counterfactual jδ : 0.89 vs. 0.27). Locating in more productive cities in actual 
allows wider nominal wage gap. Although in actual high-skill workers consume fewer 
amenities than in counterfactual (i.e. in actual the difference of amenity consumption 
between the two skills is smaller), the gain in productivity outperforms the loss in 
amenity, so in actual welfare gap is wider. Although low-skill workers are not directly 
related to the counterfactual shock on jδ , their wage 1 jw  is determined by nominal 
wage gap and skill ratio (according to equation (1.21)), so they reallocate as well. 
The fact that only dispersion in productivity causes intensive skill ratio dispersion 
but reduced welfare inequality implies that there is a channel (i.e. through the 
dispersion in productivity) for skill concentration to reduce welfare gap. This is due to 
imperfect substitution between heterogeneous skill services: concentration of 
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high-skill workers generates a large demand for low-skill workers. 
Increasing total population by 10 percent barely has an effect on welfare gap and 
skill concentration in the absence of externalities. Increasing the supply of high-skill 
workers relatively more low-skill workers reinforces skill concentration but 
diminishes welfare inequality. The nominal wage gap is about 1.55 which is smaller 
than that in reality, 1.65. These conform to the counterfactual exercises using Taylor 
Expansion method.  
In all the four counterfactual location fundamental cases, urban size distribution 
becomes more even in each case. On one hand this implies the consistency with 
D-RH, on the other hand, this suggests the need for heterogeneous skill studies. 
2.3.2.3 Exercise 3: productivity externalities 
   Exercise 3 is performed counterfactually when productivity externalities by both 
urban size and by skill mix are present. In all the counterfactual cases welfare gaps are 
wider except that in the case without dispersion in general amenities. Relative to the 
baseline, skill ratio dispersions are smaller in all the four counterfactual location 
fundamental cases. 
In the baseline with productivity externalities, higher educated cities have more 
productivity fundamentals, less desirable in general amenities, less excessively 
frictional, and more abundant in high-skill preferred amenities. Different from the 
counterfactual jg  case without externalities (Exercise 2), the mean nominal wage 
gap jλ  is larger and welfare gap is wider than those in baseline in the presence of 
productivity externalities. This might be due to that productivity externalities help to 
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improve the benefit of skill concentration to low-skill workers in reality. 
  Exercise 3: Productivity externalities: 0.072, 1.445, 0N s N sη η ζ ζ= = = = , 2010 
Scenario 1u  u∆  std( js )  mean( jλ )   
Baseline location fundamentals 12 1 0.2497485 1.645306 
Without dispersion in  jg  12.1651 1.0049 0.1097872 1.653985 
Without dispersion in ja  11.93 1.0216 0.0096764 1.67114 
Without dispersion in jρ  11.808 0.9285 0.0214204 1.652037 
Without dispersion in  jδ  11.87 1.0941 0.0922514 1.654735 
Increase total population N  by 10% 11.7968 1.0146 0.3064271 1.669669 
Increase aggregate skill ratio s  by 10% 11.9403 1.0007 0.2826678 1.64661 
Relative to the counterfactual ja  case in Exercise 2, low-skill utility level is 
lower with the presence of productivity externalities. The reason might be the too big 
mean of counterfactual urban frictions jτ , and the much more even urban size 
distribution and much more even skill ratio distribution.  
Although with productivity externalities, skill concentration and welfare gap also 
are reduced (as in Exercise 2), nominal wage inequality increases a little bit relative to 
baseline (in Exercise 2 it declines). Besides as can be seen in Essay 2 Appendix Table 
3, after mitigating dispersion in jρ , higher educated cities counterfactually have 
relatively lower productivity fundamentals, higher excess frictions, and undesirable 
high-skill preferred amenities. So, counterfactual jρ  results in higher excessive 
friction in more educated cities. Once getting the advantage of being more generally 
amenable in large and educated cities, high-skill workers’ utility would be largely lost 
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due to higher frictions. Low-skill workers are also attracted by the advantage of 
general amenities in the previously higher educated cities, so skill concentration is 
also reduced.  
Essay 2 Appendix Table 3 also shows that correlation between skill ratio and 
productivity is much smaller although positive (i.e. 0.39), compared with the case 
without externalities (i.e. 0.89). It implies that higher urban productivity is largely 
contributed by extensive agglomeration economies.  
With productivity externalities, increasing total population N  expands nominal 
wage gap and welfare gap, and intensifies dispersion in skill ratio. On one hand, 
low-skill workers themselves are not the engine of growth, they can be more 
productive due to scarcity in the GDL framework. Increasing their population 
endowment shifts their demand curve downward. So, the declined low-skill utility 
level means that the impact of downward low-skill demand shift dominates the benefit 
to low-skill workers from skill concentration. On the other hand, high-skill 
productivity is enhanced by productivity externalities with increased population. 
Relatively more increment of high-skill supply ( s ) also results in wider welfare gap 
and more skill concentration. The counterfactual nominal wage gap jλ  is smaller 
than in the counterfactual N  case, and it may be due to that more supply of 
high-skill workers drives demand curve of high-skill labor downward. 
Productivity externalities are important to location choices of heterogeneous 
skilled workers. Compared with Exercise 2, factors which are only beneficial directly 
to high-skill workers include high-skill preferred amenities jδ , urban size 
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endowment, skill ratio endowment (through productivity externalities). In these 
factors’ counterfactual cases, dispersions in skill ratio are respectively larger than 
those in Exercise 2 (i.e. 0.09 vs. 0.05, 0.31 vs. 0.25, 0.28 vs. 0.27). Secondly, the 
correlation between counterfactual welfare gaps and counterfactual dispersions in 
skill ratio (i.e. std( js )) is -0.42, but it becomes positive with productivity externalities, 
i.e. 0.07. This implies that wider welfare gap may be concurrent with more skill 
concentration in actual (with the presence of externalities). Thirdly, the correlation 
between counterfactual welfare gaps and means of counterfactual nominal wage gaps 
drops from 0.83 in Exercise 2 to 0.22 in Exercise 3. It implies that one cannot predict 
welfare gap from nominal wage gap as productivity externalities take effect. 
2.3.2.4 Exercise 4: productivity externalities and amenity externality by size 
  With presences of productivity externalities and amenity externality by urban size, 
Exercise 4 reports the counterfactual outcomes in different scenarios. 
Exercise 4: Productivity externalities and amenity externality by urban size: 
0.072, 1.445, 0.16, 0N s N sη η ζ ζ= = = = , 2010 
Scenario 1u  u∆  std( js ) mean( jλ ) 
Baseline location fundamentals 12 1 0.2497485 1.645306 
Without dispersion in  jg  11.652 1.0206 0.2912737 1.73834 
Without dispersion in ja   11.6436 1.0112 0.9422747 1.722093 
Without dispersion in jρ  11.5896 0.8401 0.2646482 1.658354 
Without dispersion in  jδ  12.046 1.1633 0.1231506 1.655467 
Increase total population N  by 10% 11.998 1.0151 0.2479747 1.650015 
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Increase aggregate skill ratio s  by 10% 12.0898 0.9933 0.2611225 1.630468 
In the baseline, more educated cities have larger productivity fundamental, less 
abundant general amenities, lower excess frictions but more bountiful high-skill 
preferred amenities. Without productivity fundamental’s dispersion across cities, skill 
concentration and welfare gap are encouraged. Low-skill workers choose to migrate 
to where are more livable in terms of general amenities. Urban size distribution is 
found to be more uneven: in larger cities, amenity externality by size is stronger. So 
low-skill workers have to suffer higher urban frictions in these cities on one hand, on 
the other hand, a larger number of low-skill workers in these large cities makes them 
not scarce such that the counterfactual 1 jw  has barely changed relative to that in the 
baseline. Therefore counterfactual low-skill utility level declines. Compared with 
exercise 3 counterfactual ja  case, the amenity externality by urban size boosts skill 
concentration but lowers welfare gap. This implies that amenity externality by size 
may help low-skill workers benefit from skill concentration. 
   The correlation between counterfactual welfare gaps and means of counterfactual 
nominal wage gaps is even smaller (i.e. 0.06) than that (i.e. 0.22) in Exercise 3. With 
more presences of externalities, the indicator role of the nominal wage gap is weaker. 
Comparing Exercise 3 with Exercise 2, correlation between counterfactual skill ratio 
dispersions (i.e. std( js )) and means of counterfactual 1 jw  is less negative (i.e. -0.60 
vs. -0.37) with productivity externalities. Comparing Exercise 4 with Exercise 3, this 
correlation is even less negative (i.e. -0.37 vs. -0.23). With more presences of 
externalities, skill concentration is more likely to benefit low-skill nominal wage. 
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2.3.2.5 Exercise 5: productivity externalities and amenity externalities 
   Exercise 5 reports the counterfactual simulation results with presences of all 
externalities: productivity externalities by both urban size and skill mix, amenity 
externalities by both urban size and skill mix. 
Exercise 5: Productivity externalities and amenity externalities: 
0.072, 1.445, 0.16, 0.7N s N sη η ζ ζ= = = = , 2010 
Scenario  1u  u∆  std( js )  mean( jλ ) 
Baseline location fundamentals 12 1 0.2497485 1.645306 
Without dispersion in jg  12.3755 1.1975 0.4408209 1.620481 
Without dispersion in ja  12.0068 1.0019 0.3079339 1.663274 
Without dispersion in jρ   12.0477 1.0447 0.3100043 1.581099 
Without dispersion in jδ  12.3686 1.1285 0.3105795 1.574146 
Increase total population N  by 10% 12.0659 1.0536 0.2574472 1.632281 
Increase aggregate skill ratio s  by 10% 12.1058 1.0739 0.2625578 1.620552 
With all externalities, dispersion in each location fundamental lowers welfare gap 
and skill ratio dispersion. In baseline higher educated cities have less abundant 
high-skill preferred amenities. Take dispersion in high-skill preferred amenities, jδ , 
for example, the advantage for high-skill workers is gained once the dispersion in jδ  
is eliminated. So, more high-skill workers are attracted to the previously higher 
educated cities. Moreover, amenity externalities by both urban size and skill ratio are 
stronger in these cities, consequently, despite that general amenities are less abundant, 
more high-skill workers migrate there relative to low-skill workers. The nominal 
wage gap is narrower because of a large supply of high-skill workers shift their 
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demand curve downward and the downward shift dominates agglomeration 
economies. The concentration of high-skill workers in these cities generates huge 
demand for low-skill workers due to imperfect substitution, thus, mean of 1 jw  
increases a lot than in the baseline, the standard deviation of 1 jw  also rises. 
It is also noted that when shutting down dispersion in productivity fundamental, 
welfare gap increases the least and skill ratio dispersion increases the least (compared 
with other three spatial fundamentals). The least increase in skill ratio dispersion may 
imply that productivity fundamentals are less important to urban productivity than 
agglomeration economies. The least increment in welfare gap may suggest that 
low-skill workers benefit from skill concentration through imperfect substitution. 
A larger total population endowment ( N ) expands welfare gap in the presence of 
all externalities, and dispersion in skill ratio increases a little, mean of nominal wage 
gap decreases a little. Generally speaking, urban population increment (i.e. high-skill 
population increment = low-skill population increment) does not generate too much 
inequality. 
Relatively more high-skill supply (i.e. increase s  by 10 percent) facilitates 
intensive skill concentration in all the counterfactual exercises (with or without 
externalities). With the presence of all externalities, welfare gap is wider than baseline; 
besides, the nominal wage gap is narrower due to the downward shift of high-skill 
demand curve. However the difference of consumptions of amenities by high-skill 
and low-skill workers expands relative to that in the baseline (i.e. 0.60 vs. 0.50), and 
this contributes to the widened welfare gap. 
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In summary, location fundamentals including productivity, general amenities, 
high-skill preferred amenities and excess friction, externalities, and skill endowments 
all contribute to determining skill concentration, nominal wage gap and welfare gap. 
In the presence of all externalities, intensive skill concentration is concurrent with 
wider welfare gap. In fact, as more externalities take effects, the correlation between 
counterfactual dispersions in skill ratio (i.e. std( js )) and counterfactual welfare gaps 
(i.e. u∆ ) becomes more positive and higher. For instance, the correlation is -0.42 in 
Exercise 2 and 0.78 in Exercise 5.  
However, the correlation between means of counterfactual nominal wage gaps and 
welfare gaps becomes smaller and smaller and even negative as more externalities 
take effects. In Exercise 2 the correlation coefficient is 0.83 but it is -0.48 in Exercise 
5. This suggests that one cannot randomly conjecture that welfare gap between 
high-skill and low-skill workers is wider based on the observed expanding nominal 
wage gap.  
Correlation between counterfactual skill ratio dispersions (i.e. std ( js )) and 
counterfactual means of 1 jw  changes from negative to positive with presences of 
more and more externalities. In the four counterfactual scenarios (Exercises 2-5), the 
correlation coefficient is respectively -0.60, -0.37, -0.23, 0.60. Also, the correlation 
between counterfactual skill concentration (i.e. std ( js )) and counterfactual low-skill 
utility levels (i.e. 1u ) changes from 0.32 (in Exercise 2) to 0.70 (in Exercise 5). Skill 
concentration does benefit low-skill workers, in terms of both low-skill wage and 
low-skill utility levels.    
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I also find that with amenity externalities by skill mix, the role of amenities 
outweighs role of productivity, so welfare gap is larger with amenity externalities. 
Amenity supply shift > Productivity demand shift (scenarios: increasing population or 
skill ratio; exercise 3 vs. 5, exercise 4 vs. 5) Comparing the counterfactual N  case 
in Exercise 3 with that in Exercise 5, I find that welfare gap is 1.0146 (in Exercise 3) 
< 1.0536 (in Exercise 5). Besides, welfare gap is 1.0007 (in Exercise 3) < 1.0739 (in 
Exercise 5) in the two counterfactual s  cases. These imply that the presence of 
amenity externality by skill mix allows role played by urban amenities to outweigh 
role played by urban productivity. Comparing Exercise 4 with Exercise 5 also results 
in similar conclusions. 
In all the counterfactual exercises, there are no more than five cities that exit (i.e. 
population not exceeding 2600). This is different from D-RH in which many more 
cities exit especially in the presence of externalities. The reason might be that in essay 
2, location choices are dependent on four types of location fundamentals and most 
cities do not just own single advantage in certain location fundamental. 
2.4 Accounting for change in welfare gap: 1980 vs. 2010 
Utilizing the same GDL urban accounting framework, essay 2 subsequently 
investigates how changes in location fundamentals, in parameters (such as 
externalities, high-skill WTP for general amenities, and constant in low-skill wage 
equation) and in skilled population endowments determine changes in dispersion in 
skill ratio, in nominal wage gap and in welfare gap between 1980 and 2010, to 
reconcile the conflicted conclusions between Moretti (2013) and Diamond (2015). 
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The primary data source of 1980 is 5% sample of 1980 U.S. Census of Population 
and Housing retrieved from IPUMS28. The geographic measuring unit in 1980 is 
converted to the definition by OMB with the standard of 2003, to be consistent with 
the metro area definition in 2010. Details on data sources and variable constructions 
are seen in Essay 2 Appendix I. 
2.4.1 Calibration of location fundamentals and parameters: 1980 
Location fundamentals including jg , ja , jρ , jδ  are calibrated in 1980. As 
Table 2.1 shows, excess friction jg  and productivity fundamental ja  can be 
calibrated analogous to 2010; besides, it is found that the commuting parameter κ = 
0.0005. According to equation (1.21) in essay 1, constant ( )1log hj  and the 
substitution elasticity ε  are estimated, and they are 8.55 and 1.6 respectively. 
Utilizing the same specification method in (2.18) and the same estimation method as 
in essay 1, productivity externality by urban size ,80Nη = 0.06, and productivity 
externality by skill mix ,80sη = 0.73. 
In order to allow amenities consumed by low-skill workers to be positive (i.e. 
1 ,80 0jγ > ), essay 2 normalizes low-skill utility level to be 10 (i.e. 1,80 10u = ). In 
addition, to make the average amenity fundamental in 1980 (i.e. mean of ,80jρ ) 
equaling to the average amenity fundamental in 2010 (i.e. mean of ,10jρ ), amenity 
externality by size ,80Nζ = 0.107 according to equation (2.19). Then I randomly pick a 
number for 80u∆ =1 and calculate the distribution of 2 ,80jγ  in 1980. Accordingly 
amenity externality by skill mix ,80sζ =0.41 and high-skill workers’ WTP for general 
                                                             
28 IPUMS is by Ruggles et al. (2010). 
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amenities 80ω =1.56.  The random picking would not change ,80sζ  and 80ω , since 
any normalization of 80u∆  would not change the distribution of 2 ,80jγ . To allow 
mean of the high-skill preferred amenities in 1980 equaling to that in 2010 (i.e. mean 
of ,80jδ  = mean of ,10jδ ), the normalization of welfare gap in 1980 is valued at 
80u∆ = 0.06. 
2.4.2 Change in location fundamentals: 1980 to 2010 
Between 1980 and 2010, distributions of location fundamentals change and 
correlations among location fundamentals also change. Table 2.3 lists the changes 
using the sample of 211 MSAs after cities in 1980 and in 2010 are merged. 
From 1980 to 2010, productivity fundamental ja  has largely increased and its 
dispersion across cities has also risen from 0.17 to 0.45. General amenity fundamental 
jρ  also has been more heterogeneous across cities in 2010 than in 1980. The 
increased dispersion may result in narrower welfare gap as suggested by Exercise 5. 
Dispersion in high-skill preferred amenities jδ  has increased a little bit; while 
dispersion in excess friction jg  has barely changed, although its mean has fallen 
from 1.18 to 1.12. 
Table 2.3: The change in location fundamentals, all externalities: 1980 and 2010 
Year 
Mean (std.) Correlation 
ja  jρ  jδ  jg  ja , jρ  ja , jg  ja , jδ  jρ , jδ  jρ , jg  jg , jδ  
1980 
0.49 
(0.17) 
-0.19 
(0.26) 
-0.51 
(0.09) 
1.18 
(0.67) 
-0.73 -0.32 -0.53 0.14 0.81 -0.09 
2010 
1.41 
(0.45) 
-0.22 
(0.42) 
-0.53 
(0.11) 
1.12 
(0.66) 
-0.37 -0.02 -0.39 0.22 0.70 -0.26 
Note: After merging between 1980 and 2010, 211 MSAs are kept. Mean of jρ  should not change, 
and mean of jδ  should not change: the merge alters a little bit of them respectively. 
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From 1980 to 2010, the correlation between ja  and jρ  has been less negative 
(i.e. -0.73 vs. -0.37), suggesting that cities with more productivity fundamentals have 
become more livable in terms of general amenity fundamental. Analogously, it is 
predicted that these cities have also become less frictional and more livable in terms 
of high-skill preferred amenities.  
2.4.3 Change in parameters: 1980 to 2010 
Productivity externalities by both urban size (i.e. Nη ) and skill mix (i.e. sη ) have 
respectively become larger since 1980. And in 2010 productivity was more explained 
by externalities by skill mix instead of by urban size, since externalities by urban size 
changed from 0.06 to 0.072, but a change in externalities by skill mix nearly doubled. 
These changes may strengthen the concurrent relationship between skill concentration 
and welfare gap.  
Table 2.4: The change in parameters: 1980 and 2010 
Year Nη  sη  Nζ  sζ  ( )1log hj  ω  κ  ε  
1980 0.06 0.73 0.107 0.41 8.55 1.56 0.0005 1.6 
2010 0.072 1.445 0.16 0.7 9.25 1.7 0.0005 1.6 
Amenity externalities by urban size (i.e. Nζ ) and by skill mix (i.e. sζ ) both have 
increased since 1980. Nearly 70 percent increase in sζ  probably may enhance 
welfare inequality. High-skill workers’ WTP for general amenities (i.e. ω ) has also 
increased, this may enlarge welfare gap as well. 
The constant in the low-skill wage equation ( )1log hj  has increased due to the 
larger mean of low-skill wage in 2010. The elasticity of substitution in 1980 is 
estimated, and it has the same value as in 2010. Commuting parameter κ  also was 
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the same in both years, i.e. 0.0005. So the changes in externalities and WTP capture 
the change in parameters from 1980 to 2010. 
2.4.4 Change in skilled population endowments: 1980 to 2010 
As can be seen from Table 2.5, the number of population in the labor force (i.e. 
N ) has been grown from 1.416e+08 to 1.994+e08, which has increased about 1.4 
times. The quantity of high-skill workers has raised more than 2.6 times even since 
1980. Aggregate skill ratio (i.e. s ) changed from 0.32 to 0.81, which is a change 
more than double. High-skill worker supply (i.e. 2L ) was larger in 2010 than in 1980, 
which nearly was a double change. More high skill supply on one hand shifts the 
demand curve down and reduces nominal wage inequality, on the other hand, it 
enhances productivity externality by skill mix and widens nominal wage gap, it also 
improves amenity externality by skill mix and intensify welfare inequality. 
   Table 2.5: The change in skilled population endowments: 1980 and 2010 
Year 1L  2L  N  s  
1980 1.071e+08 34475219 1.416e+08 0.32 
2010 1.104e+08 89029156 1.994e+08 0.81 
Source: 5% sample in 1980 and 2010 from IPUMS29. 
Note: 223 MSAs in 1980; 250 MSAs in 2010. 
2.4.5 Accounting for the changes: 1980 and 2010 
   Absolute change of welfare gap u∆  is not observed from 1980 to 2010. Essay 2 
focuses on the contributions of changes in determinants, respectively (i.e. change in 
location fundamentals, change in parameters, and change in skilled endowments), 
instead of conjecturing whether the welfare gap has widened or not over the last 
several decades. Exercise 6 reports the simulation results performed with different 
                                                             
29 Ruggles et al. (2010). 
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combinations of location fundamentals, parameters and skill endowments in 1980 and 
(or) in 2010. By comparing with different scenarios, the contributions of these 
changes in determinants can be investigated. 
Between 1980 and 2010, mean of nominal wage gap (i.e. mean( jλ )) has expanded 
since 1980. Change in nominal wage gap is due to changes in location fundamentals, 
parameters calibrated in Table 2.4 and skilled population endowments. The 
interdependence of location choices between high-skill and low-skill workers affects 
the wage gap; besides the interdependence allows location fundamentals to determine 
skilled workers’ location choices heterogeneously. Therefore, the endogenous and 
heterogeneous location choices determine urban outcomes such as nominal wage gap, 
skill ratio dispersion, and welfare gap when the general equilibrium is reached. 
In Exercise 6, the correlation between all the counterfactual welfare gaps (i.e. u∆ ) 
and all the means of counterfactual nominal wage gaps (i.e. mean( jλ )) has a 
coefficient30, -0. 36. This suggests that change in nominal wage gap is not a reliable 
indicator of change in welfare gap.  
Besides, change in skill concentration (i.e. std( js )) and change in welfare gap (i.e. 
u∆ ) are concurrent. The correlation between counterfactual welfare gaps and 
counterfactual skill ratio dispersions is as high as 0.73. This means if skill 
concentration is intensified, welfare gap between high-skill and low-skill workers is 
probably widened.  
In addition, change in skill concentration, change in low-skill utility level 1u , and 
                                                             
30 The calculation of the correlation coefficient includes 1980 baseline and 2010 baseline values. 
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change in nominal low-skill wage 1w  are concurrent. The correlation between 
counterfactual skill ratio dispersions and counterfactual low-skill utility levels is 0.70, 
and the correlation between counterfactual skill ratio dispersions and counterfactual 
low-skill wage is 0.72. These imply that low-skill workers get both nominal and real 
benefits from the skill ratio dispersion. The implication is in line with above analysis 
in essay 2 for the year 2010. 
Exercise 6: Counterfactual results, all externalities (1980 and/or 2010): 1980 to 2010 
Scenario 1u  u∆  std( js ) mean( jλ ) 
1980 baseline model calibration 10 0.06 0.0949119 1.57627 
1: 2010 { ja },1980 parameters and 
N  and s  
9.9463 0.3433 0.1265132 2.949752 
2: 2010 { ja , jρ },1980 parameters 
and N  and s  
9.8032 0.2571 0.166448 8.17412 
3: 2010 { ja , jρ , jg },1980 
parameters and N  and s  
9.8384 0.274 0.1433904 4.893885 
4: 2010{ ja , jρ , jg , jδ },1980 
parameters and N  and s  
9.8664 0.3176 0.1295628 4.052079 
5: 2010{ ja , jρ , jg , jδ } & N , s ; 
1980 parameters 
10.0145 0.2553 0.2722269 3.383735 
6: 1980{ ja , jρ , jg , jδ },parameters; 
2010 N , s  
10.3971 0.1458 0.1357854 1.118004 
7: 1980{ ja , jρ , jg , jδ }; 2010 
parameters, N , s  
12.5866 1.1796 0.2876734 0.991877 
2010 baseline model calibration 12 1 0.2388466 1.652883 
As can be seen from the comparison between 1980 baseline and case 1, change in 
productivity fundamental ja  results in lower 1u , higher u∆ , higher standard 
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deviation of js  (i.e. skill ratio dispersion), and the higher mean of the nominal wage 
gap jλ . Essay 2 Appendix Table 6 shows the correlations among urban size, skill mix 
and location fundamentals for baseline cases and counterfactual scenarios. The 
correlation between skill ratio and productivity fundamental ja  changed from 
0.7738 in 1980 baseline and to 0.0023 in case 1. The extremely low correlation may 
give the hint that most of the high-skill workers move to locations where are more 
livable, and low-skill workers do not work near the high-skill ones. There are 14 cities 
which exit in case 1. 
Comparison between case 1 and case 2 implies that change in jρ  has a 
consequence of lower 1u , lower u∆ , higher standard deviation of js  (i.e. skill ratio 
dispersion), and the higher mean of the nominal wage gap jλ . Comparison between 
case 2 and case 3 implies that change in jg  higher 1u , higher u∆ , lower standard 
deviation of js  (i.e. skill ratio dispersion), and the lower mean of the nominal wage 
gap jλ .  Comparison between case 2 and case 3 implies that change in jδ  higher 
1u , higher u∆ , lower standard deviation of js  (i.e. skill ratio dispersion), and the 
lower mean of the nominal wage gap jλ .  
The impacts of the changes in all four location fundamentals can be investigated 
by these comparisons: 1980 baseline vs. case 4, case 5 vs. case 6, and case 7 vs. 2010 
baseline. Each of the comparison gives somewhat different conclusions on the 
changes in 1u , u∆ , dispersion in js  and mean of jλ , ascribing to different 
combinations of parameters (1980 or 2010) and skilled population endowments  
(1980 or 2010). Essay 2 chooses the comparison that conforms to the general 
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associations among 1u , u∆ , dispersion in js  and mean of jλ  by their 
counterfactual values (as discussed above). So the synthesized change in all the 
location fundamentals is given by the comparison between case 7 and 2010 baseline, 
and the change in location fundamentals has the effects which are lower 1u , lower 
u∆ , lower standard deviation of js  (i.e. skill ratio dispersion), and the higher mean 
of the nominal wage gap jλ . As Exercise 5 suggests, either more heterogeneous 
productivity fundamental or more dispersed general amenity fundamental predicts 
lower welfare inequality. The changes found in Table 2.3 confirm the conclusion. 
Analogously, changes in skilled endowments (i.e. change in total population N
and change in aggregate skill ratio s ) could be investigated by both comparisons 
including: case 4 vs. case 5, 1980 baseline vs. case 6. The results of the comparison 
“1980 baseline vs. case 6” are in line with the general associations found in Exercise 6. 
The comparison implies that change in skilled endowments causes higher 1u , higher 
u∆ , higher standard deviation of js  (i.e. skill ratio dispersion), and the lower mean 
of the nominal wage gap jλ . The results also are consistent with what have found in 
the analysis of 2010. Relatively larger supply of high-skill workers over the last three 
decades has contributed to more skill concentration for U.S. metro areas, and with the 
presences of externalities, welfare gap has also been widened. 
Change in parameters (as found in Table 2.4) could be studied either by case 5 vs. 
2010 baseline or case 6 vs. case 7. The comparison between case 6 and case 7 gives 
conformed general associations discussed above. Accordingly, it is found that change 
in parameters between 1980 and 2010 produces higher 1u , higher u∆ , higher 
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standard deviation of js  (i.e. skill ratio dispersion), and the lower mean of the 
nominal wage gap jλ . As skill concentration has become one stylized fact for U.S. 
metro areas, the increased productivity externality by skill ratio might generate much 
larger demand for high-skill workers; in addition, increased amenity externality by 
skill ratio might generate much larger supply force. By the GDL urban accounting 
approach, essay 2 is capable of studying such detailed impacts of changed parameters. 
In summary, essay 2 finds that change in location fundamentals weakens skill 
concentration and welfare gap, although it facilitates wider nominal wage gap. While 
the change in skilled endowments and change in parameters respectively accounts for 
intensive skill concentration and welfare inequality. These imply the great importance 
of agglomeration economies nowadays (i.e. productivity externalities and amenity 
externalities) but the less significance of geographic fundamentals, in determining 
location choices and urban economies.  
Table 2.6: Contributions of changed location fundamentals, parameters, and skilled 
endowments 
      Contributor 
 
Item 
Change in location 
fundamentals 
 (case 7 vs. 2010) 
Change in parameters  
(case 6 vs. case 7) 
Change in skilled 
endowments 
(1980 vs. case 6) 
Change in std( js ) 0.05 0.15 0.04 
Change in u∆  0.18 1.03 0.08 
Change in mean( jλ ) 0.65 0.12 0.45 
Note: These values reported are absolute values of their effects.  
To investigate which change of the determinant contribute the most to the changes 
in skill concentration, in parameters and in skilled endowments, Table 2.6 
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demonstrates the contributions of each changed determinant to changes in skill 
concentration, in welfare gap and in the mean nominal wage gap. Table 2.6 shows that 
the largest contribution to changed skill concentration comes from parameter changes, 
and change in parameters also contributes the largest to welfare gap change. The 
change in location fundamentals is the largest contributor of changed nominal wage 
gap during 1980 and 2010. 
2.5 Conclusions 
This essay accounts for uneven distributions of skills, welfare gap and nominal 
wage gap by location attributes: productivity, amenities, and frictions in a general 
equilibrium. This equilibrium captures the interdependences among location choices 
of heterogeneous skilled workers and location attributes. Subsequently in the same 
GDL urban accounting framework, changes in skill concentration, in nominal wage 
gap and in welfare gap are investigated through changes in determinants such as 
location fundamentals (i.e. productivity, amenities and frictions), parameters (i.e. 
externalities and high-skill workers’ WTP for general urban amenities), and skilled 
endowments (i.e. increased urban population and relatively larger supply of high-skill 
workers). 
The interdependence between location choices is captured by the imperfect 
substitution between high-skill human capital service and low-skill human capital 
service, in the framework of Jones (2014)’s Generalized Division of Labor (GDL) 
productivity accounting. Amenities consumed by low-skill workers are general urban 
amenities, and high-skill workers consume general amenities (with larger WTP) and 
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high-skill preferred amenities. Urban size explains amenities consumed by low-skill 
workers; however urban size and skill composition together explain amenities 
consumed by high-skill workers. Urban frictions include those caused by congestion, 
housing bid rent and local government inefficiency. 
Properties on welfare gap in the absence of externalities are discussed by the 
quadratic Taylor Expansion method. Counterfactual exercises performed using U.S. 
metro area data in 2010 show that in the counterfactual case with zero standard 
deviation of productivity, skill ratio dispersion is smaller while welfare gap is wider. 
This implies that skill concentration benefits low-skill workers through urban 
productivity channel. Heterogeneous productivity distributed across cities generates 
more low-skill labor demand in those highly productive cities. 
By equalizing one location fundamental to its population-weighted average, essay 
2 investigates effects of location fundamentals without and with externalities. In the 
absence of externalities, counterfactual results are in line with what have been found 
using the Taylor Expansion method. 
With all externalities (i.e. productivity externalities by urban size and skill mix, 
and amenity externalities by urban size and skill mix), dispersion in each location 
fundamental is found to reduce both skill ratio dispersion and welfare gap. In the case 
of equalizing productivity fundamental, both skill ratio dispersion and welfare gap 
increases the least relative to baseline (compared with other three counterfactual 
location fundamental cases). This once again confirms the possible channel for skill 
concentration to benefit low-skill workers through productivity. 
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As more and more externalities take effects in the counterfactual scenarios, the 
association between counterfactual skill ratio dispersions and counterfactual welfare 
gaps becomes more and more highly positive. This suggests that externalities help 
skill concentration enlarge welfare gap. Specifically, with the existence of amenity 
externality by skill ratio, welfare gaps are wider, and this means amenity supply force 
dominates productivity demand force. 
In addition, more aggregate high-skill supply enhances skill concentration either 
with or without externalities. It creates wider welfare gaps with the presence of 
productivity externalities (i.e. by urban size and by skill mix).  
The changes between 1980 and 2010 come from changes in location fundamentals, 
in parameters and in skilled population endowments. Cities which are more 
productive are becoming more livable for both high-skill and low-skill workers, and 
are less excessively frictional. Besides, cities in terms of productivity fundamental 
and amenity fundamental are more heterogeneous. Productivity externalities are 
mainly driven by those generated from skill composition, i.e. clustering of high-skill 
workers facilitates higher urban productivity. Due to technology upgrading or policy 
orientation, more and more people receive higher education, and high-skill labor 
supply is enormous nowadays. It is found that change in location fundamentals 
weakens skill concentration and welfare gap, change in skilled endowments and 
change in parameters respectively explains intensive skill concentration and welfare 
inequality. Parameter changes between 1980 and 2010 contribute the largest to 
changed skill concentration and changed welfare gap, and the change in location 
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fundamentals is the largest contributor of changed nominal wage gap. 
Essay 2 is an urban accounting for skill concentration, nominal wage gap and 
welfare gap by geographic determinants, agglomeration economies, and skilled 
population endowments. These three types of determinants all play important roles in 
shaping the urban economies. Although essay 2 does not answer the question of 
changed welfare gap between 1980 and 2010 from the perspective of Moretti (2013) 
and Diamond (2015) (i.e. whether welfare gap is wider or narrower than nominal 
wage gap), it builds a general equilibrium to draw a full picture of the changes in 
urban outcomes. It offers a significant reconciliation for the conflicts between 
Diamond (2013) and Moretti (2015). The GDL urban accounting model is tractable 
and is easy to be applied to other urban systems.  
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Conclusion of the Thesis 
   The thesis studies how the Generalized Division of Labor (GDL) approach of 
Jones (2014) is adapted to an urban context, in which heterogeneous human capital 
are endogenously allocated across cities. The validation of the GDL approach to the 
urban context allows urban productivity to be measured when high-skill human 
capital quality fully captures the division of labor and allows investigating the impacts 
of coordination costs such as geographies and market thickness (i.e. agglomeration 
economies by urban size and by skill mix).  
   Utilizing Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, amenities and frictions are treated 
as instruments for urban population size and skill ratio, in order to deal with the 
endogeneity problem. Essay 1 finds that larger market potential, less labor union 
coverage and the urban form with centralized CBD are significant determinants of 
urban productivity; besides, the market thickness is of great importance. To explore 
whether high-skill workers and middle-skill workers have different location choices, 
essay 2 further finds that agglomeration economies by urban size is negative, so that 
they are crowded out of large cities. Moreover, location fundamentals such as larger 
market potential, less labor union coverage, the urban form with centralized CBD and 
closer proximity to water enhance the productivity of middle-skill workers, while 
agglomeration economies are more important to high-skill ones. The adapted GDL 
framework sheds a light on heterogeneous location choices through productivity.  
The endogenous location choices and the interdependence between heterogeneous 
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skills (captured by the GDL approach) determine urban outcomes such as skill ratio 
dispersion, nominal wage gap and welfare gap. Imperfect substitution is found to help 
low-skill workers benefit from skill concentration. The open question that whether 
welfare gap is wider than nominal wage gap between 1980 and 2010 is offered 
solutions via counterfactual exercises performed in the general equilibrium of essay 2.  
It is found that change in nominal wage gap is not a reliable indicator of change in 
welfare gap. Welfare gap change is concurrent with skill concentration change, that is 
to say, larger skill ratio dispersion in the urban system is more likely to have wider 
welfare gap between high-skill and low-skill workers. Change in parameters (i.e. 
productivity externalities, amenity externalities and high-skill workers’ WTP for 
general amenities) have the largest contribution to changes in skill concentration and 
in welfare gap between 1980 and 2010, and this suggests human capital is acting a 
part at the center of the stage. The pillar role played by externalities also shapes the 
knowledge-oriented economy nowadays. 
The thesis fills two important gaps in the urban economics literature. One is the 
geographic determinants of urban productivity. Wage is not productivity, and TFP is 
a black-box accounting of productivity. Urban productivity in the generalized 
division of labor framework, however, not only captures the division of labor, but 
also opens the black-box of productivity determinants. Advantageous location 
fundamentals and agglomeration economies lower coordination costs and facilitate 
the division of labor, such that high-skill workers can collectively acquire advanced 
knowledge and cities can be more productive. 
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The other gap is the open question of welfare gap change between 1980 and 2010. 
This thesis extends homogenous skill urban accounting model of Desmet and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2013) to incorporating heterogeneous skills and imperfect 
substitution between skills using the GDL approach of Jones (2014). The relative 
differentials in urban productivity, amenities and frictions reflect nominal wage gap, 
welfare gap and skill concentration. Influences of changed location fundamentals, 
changed agglomeration economies, and changed skilled population endowments 
between 1980 and 2010 are studied in the general equilibrium through counterfactual 
exercises.  
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Appendices 
Appendix Figure 1 
 
 
 
Source: The New York Times, Growing Education Divide in Cities: 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/05/29/us/growing-education-divide-in-cities.html. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 2 
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Appendix Figure 3 
 
Appendix Figure 3: Share of college graduates and wage of high-school graduates 
Source: “The New Geography of Jobs” by Moretti (2012). 
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Essay 1 Appendices 
Appendix I: Proofs of Lemmas 
Lemma 1.1: According to equation (1.7), 
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Appendix II: Data descriptions 
A Metropolitan Statistical Area is comprised of the Central County or counties 
containing the core urban area, plus adjacent/outlying counties that have a high degree 
of social and economic integration with the Central County, as measured by 
commutation patterns. As of June 6, 2003, the OMB has defined a total of 362 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas that incorporate 1,090 counties, containing 
approximately 83% of the U.S. population. The primary data source is the Current 
Population Survey-Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups file. In MORG Files, usual 
weekly hours/earnings are asked in the 4th and 8th interviews, so one fourth of the 
households are in the outgoing rotation each month. Weekly earnings offer a more 
accurate picture regarding the information quality of survey data, more details about 
this dataset could be found in Eeckhout, J., Pinheiro, R., & Schmidheiny, K. (2010).  
TFP-GMP: 
Total Factor Productivity is calculated using GMP divided by physical capital 
share31, and human capital share, following exact steps suggested by Desmet and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2013). Source: GDP by Metropolitan Area (millions of current 
dollars), Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
TFP-human capital and physical capital: 
Human capital and housing rental price of MSA level are obtained and calculated 
as Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013) suggest32. 
Annual average wages and skilled population: 
Wages and skilled population are retrieved from Current Population Survey 
-Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups (CPS-MORG) from 2005 to 2012. High-skill is 
                                                             
31 Monthly housing expenditures for utilities are not added to obtain the gross imputed rent. 
32 Note that in ACS 1-year estimate data set, housing is classified into owner-occupied type and 
renter-occupied type; this is different from the data set, such as Survey of Consumer Finances 
which defines housing as primary home, investment home and vacation home in detail, and Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) which categorizes mortgages as owner-occupied and 
non-owner occupied types. 
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defined as if the “highest level of school > 40”, low-skill is defined as the “highest 
level of school <= 40”, which refers to those workers without college degrees. Wage 
data is dealt with as in Eeckhout et.al (2010), except I restrict the sample to workers 
aging 16 and 64. These two are computed by data retrieved from CPS-MORG, 
Reginal Economic Accounts (REA) of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and U.S. 
Census Bureau. Data of personal income by major source and earnings by NAICS 
industry comes from REA. Data of total population in each city is obtained from 
Annual Estimates of the Population of Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical 
Areas and the source is U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division. 
Productivity fundamentals: 
Market potential is adjusted according to the definition in Harris (1954). 
Union coverage is the percentage of union membership workers divided by total 
workers, and related data is obtained from the CPS-MORG. 
The age of a city is calculated according to the city birth year, which is defined as 
its first time that amounts to “historical population” > 25000 from Wikipedia.com. 
When an MSA includes several counties, either the one with the largest population is 
chosen or the one with the earliest history is chosen for identification of its city age.  
Distance to water (coast or the Great Lakes) measures the distance of a city to its 
nearest coastal city or its nearest city (along) with the Great Lakes. If the city itself is 
a coastal or Great Lakes city, then the distance is 0.1 km. As for other cities, their 
minimal distances to their nearest coastal area city or the Great Lakes city are 
calculated as their distances to water. Distance from other cities to the destination city 
is obtained from Fu and Liao (2012). Coastal areas are gained from NOAA’s List of 
Coastal Counties for the Bureau of the Census: Statistical Abstract Series. Information 
on the Great Lakes cities is from Wikipedia.com.  
Amenity fundamentals: 
Temperature data is obtained from usclimatedata.com, cdo.ncdc.noaa.gov, and 
(Sperling and Sander (2007)), and http://www.bestplaces.net/climate/city/. If there are 
several counties in the MSA in the form of A-B-C, then county “A” is the principle 
county and information of it is adopted. Wikipedia.com completes the information 
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that cannot be found in these sources. Coastal areas are gained from NOAA’s List of 
Coastal Counties for the Bureau of the Census: Statistical Abstract Series.  
Friction fundamentals: 
Undevelopable area ratio and specific geographic supply constraints are obtained 
from Saiz (2010). 
 
Essay 1 Appendix Table 1: Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
logh2 
Log of high-skill productivity in the two-skill case; 
Log of middle-skill productivity in the three-skill case 
[1] 
logh3 Log of high-skill productivity in the three-skill case [1] 
logN Log of city size [6] 
logS 
Log of city education level in the two-skill case; 
Log of city education level in the three-skill case 
[1],[6] 
logShat Log of predicted city education level [1],[6] 
logMP Log of “Market Potential” [1], [5] 
logDistw Log of distance to water (coast or the Great Lakes) [5],[10] 
union_percent Union member coverage; in percent [1] 
s_manuf03 Share of manufacturing employment in 2003 [4] 
unionhat Predicted union coverage; in percent [1], [4] 
logAge Log of city age [9] 
year_d City age dummy (American economic history): 1-6 [9] 
d_trans City age group (transportation mode): 1-6 [9] 
d City age group (World Wars): 1-3 [9] 
lclim Log of climate score [2] 
jan_l Average low temperature in January (℃) [2] 
july_h Average high temperature in July (℃) [2] 
heating_dd Heating degree days [4] 
cooling_dd Cooling degree days [4] 
days90 Annual days in excess of 90 degrees (℉) [11] 
days32 Annual days below 32 degrees (℉) [11] 
daysprecip Number of days with precipitation [11] 
relhumidjuly Relative humidity in July [11] 
lowjanf Average low degree (℉) in January [11] 
julyheat 
July heat index (average of relative humidity and average 
high degree, ℉) 
[11] 
Other indexes Crr_edu, crr_health, pra_recreation, etc [11] 
pc_aquifer_msa Percentage of MSA overlaying aquifers [4] 
elevat_range_msa Elevation range for the entire MSA [4] 
ruggedness_msa Terrain ruggedness index for the entire MSA [4] 
S_LAND_50 Ratio of land that is not ocean within 50 km Radius [3] 
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FLAT_RATIO_50_15 Ratio of land with slope < 15% within 50 km Radius [3] 
unaval Undevelopable area ratio [3] 
lu11 Ratio of open water in land areas; 50 km radius [3] 
lu91 Ratio of woody wetlands in land areas; 50 km radius [3] 
lu92 
Ratio of  Emergent/Herbaceous Wetlands in Land Area; 50 
km radius 
[3] 
land_g Land grant institutions dummy: yes =1 [7] 
topu_number Number of world ranking universities, top 100 [8] 
Notes:  
[1] Merged Outgoing Rotation Groups from Current Population Survey: 2005-2012.  
[2] Sperling and Sander (2007) and http://www.bestplaces.net/climate/city/.  
[3] Saiz (2010), if an MSA includes counties such as A-B-C, use the principle county A’s 
information, the principle county in the MSA is usually the first one in the MSA name.  
[4] Duranton and Turner (2011).  
[5] Fu and Liao (2012). 
[6] U.S. Census Bureau, Population Division: Table 1.  Annual Estimates of the Population of 
Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas: April 1, 2000 to July 1, 2009 
(CBSA-EST2009-01); Table 1. Annual Estimates of the Population of Metropolitan and 
Micropolitan Statistical Areas: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2012 (CBSA-EST2012-01).  
[7] National Institute of Food and Agriculture, U.S. Department of Agriculture.  
[8] Times Higher Education World Reputation Ranks: http://www.timeshighereducation.co.uk/ 
world -university-rankings/2012/reputation-ranking.  
[9] Wikipedia.  
[10] NOAA’s List of Coastal Counties for the Bureau of the Census: Statistical Abstract Series. 
[11] Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013): sources are www.weatherbase.com, Places Rated 
Almanac by Savageau (2000), and Cities Ranked & Rated by Sperling and Sander (2004). 
 
Essay 1 Appendix Table 2: Descriptive statistics of main variables  
Variable Mean Std.dev 
2-skill case:   
logh2 3.02 .78 
logN 13.32 1.04 
logs -0.26 0.40 
3-skill case:   
logh2 6.45 0.81 
logh3 7.26 1.11 
logN 13.03 1.03 
logS -0.87 0.20 
Productivity fundamentals:   
logMP 58.01 1.20 
unionhat 0.07 0.01 
d_trans 4.33 1.49 
logDistw 3.02 2.53 
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logAge 4.37 0.92 
d 1.81 0.83 
year_d 3.21 1.50 
Note: 2-skill case and productivity fundamentals have 1200 observations using 2005-2012 pooled 
data, and the 3-skill case has 246 observations using the averaged 1-year sample.  
 
Essay 2 Appendices 
Essay 2 Appendix I: Data 
Essay 2 adopts 5 percent sample of 1980 census and 2010 census of Population 
and Housing from IPUMS, Regional Economic Accounts (REA) and National Income 
and Product Accounts (NIPA) from Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Both 
geographic measuring units in 1980 and in 2010 are converted to the definition by 
OMB with the standard in 2003. There are 250 MSAs in 2010 and 223 MSAs in 1980. 
Low-skill workers are defined as “educd <= 080”, i.e. without a college degree 
(including some college but no degree and below). High-skill workers are defined as 
“educd > 080”, i.e. with a college degree (including associate college degree and 
above). 
Consumption: 
Aggregate consumption is the consumption net of housing and transportation costs 
by goods and services. Aggregate consumption of all cities C = Market-based PCE – 
Motor vehicles and parts – Gasoline and other energy goods – Transportation services. 
Market-based PCE (Personal Consumption Expenditure) is a supplemental measure 
that is based on household expenditures for which there are observable price measures 
in the addenda from National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).  
Following Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2013), I also proxy private consumption 
net of housing and transportation in each city, jC , by its retail earnings: 
. .
.S.
j
j
j
j
j
retail earnings inMSA
C private consumption net of housing and travel inU S
retail earnings inU
retail earnings inMSA
C
retail earnings inMSA
= ∗
= ∗
∑
 
Retail earnings are defined as personal earnings from retail trade in the Regional 
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Economic Accounts (REA) of Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). 
The correlation between total private consumption in this essay and in Desmet and 
Rossi-Hansberg (2013) is sufficiently high.  
Consumption per capita: ( )j j jc C total population= . Calculations of aggregate 
consumption and consumption per capita in 1980 are the same as in 2010. 
Total population: 
   I adopt data of population (Census Bureau mid-year population estimates, July 1) 
in 2005 from Regional Economic Accounts, Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
Total population excluding retirees: 
Total population excluding retired people (i.e. labor force), jN , is obtained by 
( ),2010 ,2010 ,2010* 1j j jN total population oldshare= −  
( ),1980 ,1980 ,1980* 1j j jN total population oldshare= −  
in which people aged 65 and above are counted as old and retired. Old people shares 
in 1980 and in 2010 are retrieved from 1980 census and 2010 census. Therefore 
high-skill population=labor force*high-skill weight obtained from 2010 census, and it 
is analogous to low-skill population calculation. Note that iN  =employed workers + 
dependent children. The same calculation method applies to that in 1980. 
Aggregate personal income: 
iW , comes from personal income in the REA of BEA. So high-skill wage = personal 
income* high-skill income weight from 2010 census/ high-skill population, and the 
same calculation method applies to that in 1980. 
 
Essay 2 Appendix II: Counterfactual Tables 
Essay 2 Appendix Table 1: Population endowments, standard deviations, correlations, 
0N s N sη η ζ ζ= = = =  
Endowments Standard deviation Correlation 
1L = 1.103e+08 std( ja )= 1.944431 corr( ja , jρ )= -0.83 
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2L = 88944217 std( jρ )= 0.3597189 corr( ja , jg )= -0.2071 
J = 250 std( jδ ) = 0.2243921 corr( ja , jδ )= 0.6522 
 std( jg )= 0.7278333 corr( jρ , jδ )= -0.9006 
  corr( jρ , jg )= 0.5353 
  corr( jg , jδ )= -0.5023 
Note: 1. Above values are calculated without externalities in 2010. 2. In the absence of all 
externalities, productivity fundamental is urban productivity, i.e.  2j ja h= , amenity fundamental is 
consumed amenities of low-skill workers, i.e. 1j jρ γ= . 3. To keep the accuracy of Taylor Expansion 
calculations, I  
 
Essay 2 Appendix Table 2: Correlations: urban size, skill mix, location fundamentals, 
0N s N sη η ζ ζ= = = =  
Correlations  ( js , ja ) ( js , jρ ) ( js , jg ) ( js , jδ ) ( js , jN ) ( jN , ja ) ( jN , jρ ) ( jN , jg ) 
Baseline 0.8857 -0.8754 -0.2845 0.8477 0.2767 0.2513 -0.2058 -0.4002 
W/O. jg  0.866 -0.8781 0 0.8631 0.0845 0.0995 0.3267 0 
W/O. ja  0 0.4887 0.2063 -0.0563 0.26 0 0.2646 -0.2748 
W/O. jρ   0.8735 0 -0.419 0.9053 0.709 0.6538 0 -0.4958 
W/O. jδ  0.268 0.1004 0.3902 0 0.2279 0.0226 0.0167 -0.4282 
N :10% 0.8852 -0.8758 -0.2849 0.8482 0.2747 0.2479 -0.213 -0.4172 
s :10% 0.8852 -0.8758 -0.2848 0.8482 0.2879 0.2619 -0.2126 -0.3951 
 
Essay 2 Appendix Table 3: Correlations: urban size, skill mix, location fundamentals, 
0.072, 1.45, 0N s N sη η ζ ζ= = = =  
Correlations  ( js , ja ) ( js , jρ ) ( js , jg ) ( js , jδ ) ( js , jN ) ( jN , ja ) ( jN , jρ ) ( jN , jg ) 
Baseline 0.3903 -0.8754 -0.2845 0.8477 0.2767 -0.0006 -0.2058 -0.4002 
W/O. jg  0.2593 -0.8552 0 0.8186 0.7089 -0.0259 -0.3443 0 
134 
 
W/O. ja  0 0.1573 0.1315 -0.1219 0.9855 0 0.1027 0.1087 
W/O. jρ   -0.0462 0 0.2078 -0.1069 0.9936 -0.0532 0 0.2157 
W/O. jδ  -0.0922 0.3054 0.466 0 0.9822 -0.0673 0.2233 0.4054 
N :10% 0.3258 -0.483 0.2179 0.4909 0.6488 0.0897 -0.205 -0.0868 
s :10% 0.3251 -0.4833 0.2046 0.4876 0.6303 0.0753 -0.1704 -0.1076 
 
 
Essay 2 Appendix Table 4: Correlations: urban size, skill mix, location fundamentals, 
0.072, 1.45, 0.16, 0N s N sη η ζ ζ= = = =  
Correlations  ( js , ja ) ( js , jρ ) ( js , jg ) ( js , jδ ) ( js , jN ) ( jN , ja ) ( jN , jρ ) ( jN , jg ) 
Baseline 0.3903 -0.8549 -0.2845 0.8477 0.2767 -0.0006 -0.4574 -0.4002 
W/O. jg  0.2654 -0.8627 0 0.6945 0.7453 0.0115 -0.366 0 
W/O. ja  0 -0.2983 -0.0098 0.2234 0.7094 0 -0.4471 -0.2154 
W/O. jρ   -0.2022 0 0.4998 -0.4238 0.8671 -0.4014 0 0.577 
W/O. jδ  0.3287 -0.7743 -0.5136 0 0.717 0.1552 -0.933 -0.6576 
N :10% 0.3899 -0.8479 -0.2708 0.8345 0.2834 -0.0005 -0.4596 -0.4021 
s :10% 0.3795 -0.8496 -0.2781 0.8483 0.2723 -0.0027 -0.4593 -0.4048 
 
 
Essay 2 Appendix Table 5: Correlations: urban size, skill mix, location fundamentals, 
0.072, 1.45, 0.16, 0.7N s N sη η ζ ζ= = = =  
Correlations  ( js , ja ) ( js , jρ ) ( js , jg ) ( js , jδ ) ( js , jN ) ( jN , ja ) ( jN , jρ ) ( jN , jg ) 
Baseline 0.3903 -0.8549 -0.2845 -0.402 0.2767 -0.0006 -0.4574 -0.4002 
W/O. jg  0.1958 -0.9119 0 0.0437 -0.1359 -0.0393 0.1107 0 
W/O. ja  0 -0.8392 -0.2662 -0.4134 0.2145 0 -0.4406 -0.3961 
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W/O. jρ   -0.4466 0 0.836 0.0623 -0.4585 0.0043 0 -0.3904 
W/O. jδ  0.3782 -0.8348 -0.2566 0 -0.1328 -0.1226 -0.1105 -0.2745 
N :10% 0.3905 -0.8485 -0.3047 -0.3736 0.1616 -0.0542 -0.3776 -0.3816 
s :10% 0.3792 -0.8452 -0.3279 -0.328 0.2282 -0.0234 -0.4381 -0.3994 
 
 
Essay 2 Appendix Table 6: Correlations: urban size, skill mix, location fundamentals, 
all externalities (1980 and/or 2010) 
Correlations ( js , ja ) ( js , jρ ) ( js , jg ) ( js , jδ ) ( js , jN ) ( jN , ja ) ( jN , jρ ) ( jN , jg ) 
1980 0.7738 -0.7853 -0.3459 -0.2694 0.2148 0.1385 -0.3778 -0.3808 
2010 { ja },1980 
parameters & N, s 
 
0.0023 -0.5877 -0.2122 -0.1231 0.6525 -0.0368 -0.452 -0.2839 
2010 { ja , jρ },1980 
parameters & N, s 
 
0.4374 -0.8087 -0.2846 -0.2613 0.4281 0.0727 -0.3644 -0.2519 
2010 { ja , jρ , jg },1980 
parameters & N, s 
 
0.4312 -0.8571 -0.446 -0.1946 0.4732 0.0552 -0.3934 -0.2641 
2010{ ja , jρ , jg , jδ }, 
1980 parameters & N, s 
 
0.3343 -0.8625 -0.4976 -0.2985 0.667 0.063 -0.4995 -0.2954 
2010{ ja , jρ , jg , jδ } & 
N, s; 1980 parameters 
 
0.2758 -0.743 -0.4139 -0.227 0.7171 0.0651 -0.4095 -0.2421 
1980{ ja , jρ , jg , jδ }, 
parameters; 2010 N,s 
 
0.6276 -0.6471 -0.2223 -0.2417 0.2421 0.1724 -0.414 -0.3976 
1980{ ja , jρ , jg , jδ }; 
2010 parameters, N,s 
-0.2234 0.0304 0.0749 0.7037 -0.4039 0.0896 -0.0931 -0.1512 
2010 0.3097 -0.8551 -0.3208 -0.4106 0.3045 -0.0007 -0.4854 -0.4234 
 
